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ITED £ ~ I'ilLITAxiY STiiAT&GY by Thomas R.
Wallace, Lieutenant Commander, U.o. Navy
This thesis traces the function the doctrine of Passive
taliation ->layed a irirr- the evolution of OS military strategy
from Jorld Jar II through 1964, It Includes a discussion of
the development of strategic bombardment, the impact of strate
atomic weapons, the development of a strategy based on mas:lve
retaliatory capability, and a short discussion of overkill.
litionally, British, French, and Russian strategies and those
countries 1 reactions to j- strategy are briefly discussed.
or conclusions are that subsequent to w II a
strategy relying o ; massive retaliatory capability was a
lo.Ttal eventuality, t at the US relied primarily, but for a
short period, uoon tnis strategy, and that b the mid-1950's
the US required balanced forces in order to implement the
strategic concent. Since at least 1955 the trend to provide
more balanced mi itary forces, containing both strategic










Massive Retaliation, as an offioially recognized doc-
trine, was formulated in the early nine teen-fifties. It was
s eciflcally outlined by the prospective Secretary of State
John foster Dulles in May, 1952 » though he had advocated a
strategy approximating Massive Retaliation as early as 1950.1
A national defense strategy which relied on a single, "pure 1*,
long-range means of ensuri g U r lted states seourity, and fail-
ing that the quick and thorough defeat of an enemy, appealed
to the American people especially during the years immediately
subseque t to the Second world var. The development of poli-
tical and military philosophies of strategy in the early post-
war years prompted by weaoons technology and the disillusion-
ment of tr-'© Cold War culminated in this stand-off national
security defense strategy.
Massive Retaliation was, and remains to this day, a
doctrine of deterrence and as such was not a true doctrine of
iFrom April 6, 1950, until March 21, 1952, John Foster
Dulles was Consultar t to the Secretary of State who was then
Dean Acheson. During this period Dulles 1 primary missions
were with res eot to concluding a Japanese Feace Treaty and
three Pacific oecurity Treaties. At this time he also irade
several pronounc s on United State* defense- strategy which
were at variance with those currently in force. They are
~>ted in Chapter III e context of the discussion
conce the formulation of the doctrine of Massive Re-
taliation.
•
2warfare. "The strategy known as deterrence is, In essence,
a form of diplomacy, because it aims to prevent certain moves
by nations believed to be hostile by threatening them with
Mlitary retaliation." 2 Its rimary puroose was to prevent
war rather than to serve as a means of waging warfare. This
primary objective of deterrence is not so much to threaten a
prospective enemy but to load u > nis cost/risk factor above
his tolerable level of acceptance. 3 "The ooncept of deterrence
is central to strategic theory because present-day diplomacy
wants to substitute, once and for all, the threat of force for
the use of it."**
The search for a strategy which would ensure national
security during the pre-Korean War years was increasingly
domi ated by the dread of another war. The revolution in war-
fare, heralded by the development and successful application
of the atomic bomb, lent great impetus and urgency to this
search. Henry Kissinger aptly summed up the quandry repre-
sented by a strategy based on nuclear deterrence by stating
that i
2
.iaymond Aron, The Grea t Debate : Theories of Luclear
Strategy , trars. ^.rnst Pawel (Garden City* Doublsday ar d
Company, 1965), p. vi
.
3charles 0. Lerohe, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Concepts
of I tematlonal roiitjcs (Knglewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1963), p. 202.
^Aron, ojp. clt
. , p, 199.

The problem of deterrence is novel In the history of
military policy. In the past, the military establishment
was asked to orepare for war. Its test was oombat; its
vindication victory. In the nuclear age, however, victory
has lost its traditional tig lficance. The outbreak of
war is increasingly co • sidered the worst catastrophe.
Henceforth, the adequacy of any military establishment will
be tested by its ability to preserve oeace.
The paradoxical consequence is that the suocess of mili-
tary polloy deoends on essentially psych ^o. leal criteria.
Deterrence seeks to prevent a give,1 , course of action by
making it seem less attractive t an all possible alterna-
tives.
5
8 icifically, then, the function of Passive Retaliation,
as it was originally formulated, was to create the proper image
in a prospective enemy's rci d. ;ie is, theoretically, to b^
beset by uncertainty as to whether he will be retaliated a-
frainst in any specific crisis. If he does not comalt aggressions
due to this line of reasoning he is deter; ed. The pure form
of Massive Retaliation forces the opoonent in each instance of
contemplated crisis or aggression to ask himself: rt Is this
worth a nuclear war?**
In this respect the doctrine of Massive Retaliation was
wedded to the policy of containment. One could say that the
Jnlted States contained in order to show unambiguous provo-
cation for retaliation, and conversely one could say that the
United States retained a retaliatory capability in order to
contain.
5fienry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (:;ew York*
Harper and Brothers, 1961), tp. 11-12.
.•
4Dulles spent a significant portion of his time con-
st ructing and welding together unilateral, bilateral, and
multilateral pacts and treaties in order to draw the line
across which Communism was to be deterred from setting Its
foot.
As the doctrine of Massive Retaliation evolved into
the middle nineteen-fiftles, complete reliance upon it was
no longer attempted because of the Russian strategic nuclear
delivery capability and Massive retaliation's apparent failure
to constitute the complete solution to international crises,
oic the oucset, the credibility of the deterrent was
marginal. Undoubtedly, the United States had the means and
tne ability to obliterate ussia. dowever, the doubt pivoted
on the question as to whether the United States would actually
launc; a retaliatory strike In response to lesser aggression.
The consensus was that the United States would not, and this
was borne out daring the Suez Crisis, the Indochinese War,
the ^Tur.p-srian tievolution, and the Quemoy and Matsu (The For-
mosa otraits) Crisis. The deterrent was available but Its
credibility, with reference to the psyc olo leal factors, was
very seriously impaired.
The actual period during which Massive retaliation was
the sole defense strategy of the United States was quite short.
istorically it dates from late 1953t until early 1955*
Though the former date may be cashed back as far as Dulles 1
.
5statement in Life Magazine In f*ay, 1952* Dulles was not yet
I Secretary of State. Purthermore, it was apparent before
1955» that the credibility of the deterrent was not sufficient
to stop all levels of crisis and ag ression. This was due to
the fact that the United States had not set a finite limit on
the level of provocation necessary to trigger retaliation, nor
could it have been conceiveable to do so except in any given
circumstance and that would have been after the fact.
For the deterrent to be credible, it is necessary that
the enemy know beforehand what level of aggression will pro-
voke retaliation. If he is left completely in doubt, or if he
has even restricted freedom of action, the deterrent becomes
unstable and invites nrevertive or pre-emptive attack.
The Great Debate of the middle and late fifties was a
soul-searching on the part of full and part-time strategists
to formulate a credible deterrent strategy. Obviously, 'asslve
Retaliation as the solution had failed. However, the trend
which was becoming more general, favored a balanced military
establishment. This was opoosed, vigorously and vehemently,
by the advocates of counterforce—the successor to tfassl
retaliation. George Lowe characterizes the two opposing ce
in terms of being either Traditionalists or Utopians *
A Utopian In the real" of strategic theory is anyone
who makes little or no distinction between the traditional
uses of force and the new dimensions of nuclear violence.
A Traditionalist, in the field of strategic thinking, is
anyone who, although granting the need for an effective
-nl'itary establishment, is convinced of the absolute
•
necessity for using no more force tuan necessary to imple-
•it foreign policy decisions made by the constituted
authorities.
6
The proponents of a pure nuclear stratevio theory, the
->olars, advocated more of the *&•« y insisted that the
United states maintain itself in an unassailable position la
the arms race by building the most formidable retaliatory force
imaginable. ielrs was a strategy of winning the war," and
they were not averse to advocating a pre-emptive strike. On
the other hand, the Traditionalists believed that minima
deterrence (or a finite deterrent) was necessary only to counter
mutual deterrence, thereby stabilizing the stalemate. They
further believed that balanced forces baoking up this deterrent
were essential to orovide graduated, or selective, response
to either crises or aggressions. They believed that the
function of Massive uetallatlon was only to counter opposing
nuclear strength.
Utopian arguments notwithstanding, the general trend
away from strict reliance on the deterrent of Massive retalia-
tion continued. The stalemate of mutual deterrence from 1955
on rendered the oolicy of Passive uetaliati n s ;icldal. The
popular analogy of two men holding cocked guns at each other's
heads is apropos. A solution would have to be found to this
^George B« Lowe, The Age of Deterrence (Boston: Little,




7Intolerable situation. That solution would be to insert in
front of Passive retaliation a number of lesser responses.
Bather than Massive etaliation being the only recourse, it
would now be relegated to that of the last, and ultimate,
response available i the strategic arsenal.
The Democratic victory of I960 ushered in another
national security policy. Variously called the "Kennedy
Shift," it is now known as the strategy of the Flexible t-
soonse. This "new" strategy in reality differed only in de-
tail and terminology from the last policies of the previous
administration. Flexible nesoonse guaranteed that force
would be met with equal or superior force regardless of the
type or degree of a r^ssion committed. In this respect,
though it made limited or conventional war i£ore likely, it
made nuclear war -ore unlikely at the outset. Because of the
United States commitment to engage in and successfully con-
clude any aggression, by definition it was an escalation
strategy.
In the strategy of Flexible Response, nuclear bombard-
ment was retained as the ultimate recourse. Though the name
had changed, massive retaliation remained as a strategic de-
terrent. Its role as a doctrine had changed, gather than
attempting to deter all aggressio s by retaining the choice
to retaliate at places and at times of our own choosing with
nuclear bombardment, it had now been relegated to one ?Uche
-<*fl!
8in the forms of res onse available to the strategist, ftow
strength would be countered with graduated and appropriate
comparable strength. It Is interesting to note, however,
that President Kennedy in explanation of the doctrine of
flexible aesoonse stated that the United states res.rved the
right to res >ond with nuclear capability to a sub-nuclear
provocation.? in t- is respect fie was maintaining the credi-
bility of the deterrent while continuing to provide a more
bala oed defense establishment. The psychological problem
ir. olved ras that of maintaining the credibility of the de-
terrent in the fiussian mind while at the same time implicitly
acknowledging that the United States would not rely solely
on massive nuclear retaliatory oower.
This thesis will trace the doctrine of Massive re-
taliation, and it will not restrict Itself to the critical
period of 1953-1955. It will outline, in Chapter II, the
history of contemporary strategic bombardment, discuss the
critical years during which Massive retaliation wss the work
horse of national defense strategy, and outline some of the
arguments and criticisms than prevalent, both within the
United States and abroad. fhis will be followed by a dis-
cussion of the evolution of United States strategy during the
7The similarity between Kennedy *s words and those of
Dulles are striking with respect to this issue. They are
considered in more detail in Chaoter IV.
ad
9late fifties, when Passive retaliation lost its credibility
to deter lesser aggressions. This was the critical period
of transition between the all-or-not- Ing solution and the
eventual development of graduated deterrence—or as it is
now known--the Flexible response.
It was the Kennedy election of I960 that epitomized
the shift away from the strict reliance upon Massive retalia-
tion, though the roots of its successor strategy cay be found
as much as five years earlier. The Initial concept had given
way to nore flexible and less precipitous policies. However,
during the five or so years preceding the election of i960,
national security policy had broadened in scope and definition.
In the late rvineteen-fifties the United States had develooed
a national defense strategy that did not rely completely
u-on Massive Hetaliation, but had considerably sore flexi-
bility in its res >onsiver.ess than critics attributed to it.
Critics of the doctrine of Massive retaliation severely
criticized its advocates on two cou ts prior to i960. In
the first ^lace, ar.d the most pop ilar argument, they accused
the Utopians of risking all-out war, and falling tnat the
surrender of the Free horld to Communism in piecemeal fashion.
In the second place they accused the administration of not
having either a credible deterrent or a sufficient one. This
latter accusation centered around the "bomber gap" and then
the "m'sslle gap.** That the administration repeatedly refuted
-
10
both these accusations did very little to still partisan
accusations that increasingly took on political overto
as the I960 election drew near.
In retrosneot It can be said that both these accusations
were erroneous, however they did serve their political purposes.
National defense strategy subsequent to 1961 was a continuation,
albeit a strengthened continuation, of the strategy of the
aepubllcan administration tuat preceded it.
Needless to say the role of strategic nuclear forces
in the formulation of national security oolicy was, and con-
tinues to be, one of the most partisan subjects of debate in
American foreign policy. In this respect the critics ran the
gamut from unqualified Justification of the strategies to
vilification of the strategists and doomsday proohesies of
the eventualities of their strategies.
.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OP fEGIC JMfiNT
The introduction of the aircraft into the theatre of
battle durln- the First world war heralded a revolution in
warfare tantamount to that brought by the submarine. ihough
its war-time apulloations had been largely tactical in nature -
fighter sorties, reconnaissance, so r ie close ground support,
plus a few abortive, inconclusive raids on major cities well
behind the lines, for Instance London in 1917 — it oresaged
the revolution that would transform land combat into the three
dimensional confliot that is now familiar and accepted. Dur-
ing the inter-war oerlod the advocates of the new form of war-
f re fought mightily, and in many resoects vainly, to gain
acceptance for it. However, Just as military strategists
thirty years later, they were olagued with a less than optimum
vehicle, budgetary restrictions, and the entrenched forces of
reaction.
The controversy over the use of this new weapon begun
between the two World Wars continued through World War II,
and its influence determined, to a great extent, the reorgani-
zation of the United States defense establishment in the late
nlneteen-forties. Further, the increasing: dominance of air
power in the determination of strategy led to a major contro-
versy between the United States military services. The
-
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proponents of a pure air power strategy wanted totally to rely
on strategic air power, while the other services were convinced
that balanced forces were essential to maintain United States
security and defend its commitments.
The writings of Gulllo Douhet
The first formal recognition of air oower as a weapon
with strategic applications is credited to Brigadier General
Guilio Douhet, an Italian Flying Officer, who set forth his
thesis In The Command of t e Air* oubiished In 1921. Though
some officers in the services of each of the combatants of the
first World War were aware of the new dimension in warfare with
its nearly unlimited ootential, Douhet was the first to pro-
phesy the long-ran e strategic implications of the airplane.
In his treatise he defined the selection of the proper
aerial strategy as including selection of objectives, the
grouping of zones, and the determination of target oriorities.
The ohrase selection of objectives had reference to those
r?ets that would inflict the most : erious strate ic damage
>n an enemy, Douhet was preoccupied with strategic rather
1 Bernard Brodie, Strategy In the fissile Age (Princetons
Princeton University press, 1959) • Chapter! 2-3."" This con-
tains excellent discussion of the early growings for an aerial
strategy, and Brodie devotes Ghaoter 3 entirely to strategy
as developed by Douhet* 8t bo Guilio Douhet, Command of
the Air , trans. Dino Ferrari (Hew York t Coward-McCann, 19^2);





than tactical a ^olic?i tior.s for airoraft. He had been convinced
th it the aerial do ts of the first World War were a waste-
ful application of the airplane. His preferred targets in-
cluded primarily factories and cities utilizing exolosives on
the former and gas and explosives on the latter.
The expression the grouping of zones was an early at-
tempt to define the expected area that a unit of aircraft
could destroy by saturation bombing. This was certainly fore-
sighted, but premature, considering the vastly reduced loads
that early aircraft could carry coupled with the range re-
strictions lnv ived. However, Douhet formulated the conception
that aircraft r-.ronerly grouDed and carrying the proper weapons
co ild lay T >aste to large areas of an aggressor's industrial
and urban oomplexes. The weakness of Douhet *s reasoning lay
in the inability of aircraft contemporary to his time to carry
enough wea o s to be effective. Further, tney had severe range
11 itatlons which had been the result of a preoccupation with
the development of only fighter aircraft
.
Though the mass bo s of the second half of World
War II in large part vindicated Douhet, preoccupations witn
t ctioal aircraft had also hampered United States efforts,
especially in the development of an aircraft with long-range
strategic capabilities.
The determination of t .ioritles of targets showed
Douhet as a true forerunner of strategic thinking.
••
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essential concern was with the forces that could oppose the
strategic force. In this case it was the aircraft factories,
refineries, and ground supoort f duties. Douhet virtually-
Ignored any consideration of support to ground operations of
conventional armies. In this respect he had been disillusioned
by the stalemated trench warfare of the first World War, and
could not foresee the implications of a truly mobile land
force such as the German Panzer concept or trie Allied armored
divisions of the next war working in close coordination with
aircraft to extend Its ran f?e.
Douhet, then, foresaw the role of air power not as a
contributory asoect of warfare but as the way to win the war.
All other forms arc? a Plications of military force were sub-
servient to, ard at best contributory to, the role of air power.
The three concepts of objectives, weaoons applications
on the tarret, and priorities are common to all forms of war-
fare, -fever, the Import is that Douhet had recognized the
oenetrative and potentially destructive nature of airborne
weaoons. Needless to say, his efforts were not wasted on a
small but dedicated group within the embryonic United States
Army Air Corps, and the role of this new dimension in warfare
ve rise to heated controversy between World Wars I and II.
Air Power In the Second World War




tentatively and then with Increasing intensity, bobbed e
others 1 homelands mostly -it night. This was the extension of
oonfllot In another dimension in that it had no direct el feet
on the front line battles. The direot effect was that it now
ensured that the war could be defined as total. Not only
were the combatant trooos engaged, so was the population under
direct attack.
American entry into the field of strategic bombing in
Surone began in 19^3* and reached significant oroportions in
1944, utilizing daylight raids for greater accuracy and target
discrimination. The development of the B-l? as a weapons
system s iltable to this task took approximately eight years,
and even then it Kaa not orofltabr/ effective without long-
range fighter protection. As was earlier referred to, the
Army had concentrated on tactical aircraft to the detriment
of the development of an effective long-range aircraft.
3-1? enjoyed a dubious refutation until it had been properly
armed and given the necessary range and load-carrying capa-
bility to be nearly ael ^-sustaining.
It was no secret among airmen that the Army was re-
luctant to undertake a urogram of long-ranged aircraft
de ent, fearing that it might lead the Air Corps
away from what the Army regarded as the paramount job of
air oower: direot eunoort of ground troops.
^
^Alexander . De Seversky, Victory Through Air Power




In the Pacific Theatre the B-29 Superfortress was in-
troduced, flying raids upon Jaoan from China in 19^3t (an-
other example of range restrictions), and then from the Pacific
island bases of Guam, Tinlan, and Saipan in 19**4. Their
objective was to deliver either large weapons or a large V
load at extreme ranges, which had the corollary effect of en-
couraging explosives and bomb<tevelopment, and longer range
self-oroteoted vehicles. By the earn* token, carrier air stri s
were in many instances strategic by definition in the sense
that the carrier task force only moved the vehicle closer to
the target prior to launch.
Even during the War, however, the controversy over the
role of the air forces continued. In 19^3» D© Seversky could
say that i "The most significant single fact about the wsr in
progress is the emergence of aviation as the paramount and
decisive factor in warmaking. H 3 But this stat was sub-
jected to serious doubt bv the men responsible for the successful
prosecution of the war effort. The significant controversy
d irlng the war cocemed target selection. It was on t-^is
p. 2^-5. Two other books which are useful In understanding the
considerations of the a-rolication of air power i;i ,.orld War II
are 1 Frank w. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in
World War II (Chicago* University of Chicago Press, ly48) ; and
Steven W. Sears, Air war Against Hitler's Germany (New York*
American Heritage Publishing Company, Inc., 1964).
3i)e Seversky, op . ol't .,, p. 3
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subject that jurists like De Seversky and Mitchell came into
direct conflict with men who had the actual responsibility for
counting the total war effort.
Combat generals and the civilian war leaders initially
committed the bomber force to target systems sore directly in
k
su^oort of tactical ooeratlors. These were, for instance,
marshalling yards, other transportation systems, ond assembly
olants. The prooonents of the more nure strategic concepts
argued for the targeting of basic industrial and resources
refinement plants. In this latter category are chemicals,
oil refineries, and the most well Known — the German ball
bearing factories.
5
Strategic bombing during World War II culminated in the
two fttOslo bomb dro-s on Jaoan. This symbolically , and in
reality, freed st o bombing adherents from tacticians
corao^etely. The United States had reached the noint where
strategic target systems were an entity. It nad become a
^Indirect tactical support includes targets to the rear
of the c t zone such as bridges, airfields, marshalling
yards, etc. These targets are suitable for medium or high
level bonbing. Tactical close air support, on the other h* ,
is airborne firepower in direct support of front line troops.
Targets such as tank or trooo concent ations and support of
troop advances are best handled by the fighter- ;r or 3 1
and medium bomber types at shorter ranges and directly con-
trolled by forward observers with the troops.
5walt W. Eos tow, The United states in t.-..v id arena
(New Yorkt H-^roer and Row, I960), p. 64. Ibstos presents a
complementary discussion of the development of Army Air Corps
Strategic bombing in World War II, to that referred to earlier.
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separate planning and iraplernentin capability, "otrate;; laally,
the term air power apolies to that force of aircraft and




The Second World War represented a revolution in war-
fare or two counts; the development and mas lication of
aircraft and the atomic bomb. However, a victorious si: e in
war had traditionally tended to laose into the state of com-
placent self-satisfaction of being invulnerable. It is un-
questionable that the United States was the preponderant world
power, but. the lessons of air oower were available to all.
One of De Seversky f s premonitions accurately reflected this;
1. The rapid expansion of the range and striking power
of military a- iation makes it certain that the United
States will be exoosed to destruction fro-n the air, within
a predictable neriod, as are th« British Isles today.
2. Those who deny the practical possibility of a direct
aerial att ck on America are lulling the American people
Into an utterly false sense of safety which may prove as
disastrous to us as the Maglnot Line mentally roved to
Prance
•
3. To meet this threat to the existence and inde-
pendence of our country we must begin Immediately to pre-
pare for the specific kind of war conditioned by t e ad-
vent of air oower. That can mean only an interheralsDheric
war llrect across oceans, with air power flghtin not over
this or that locality, but by longitude and latitude any-
where in the uninterrupted "air ocearw" Such preparedness
calls not merely for rcore aviation but for new military
organization and new strategic conceptions .
'
^Brodie, op_. clt
. , p. 20.




The atomic bomb had tremendous imoact on military
strategy, but the United States had to report to discrete
targetin and needed many delivery vehicles. These aircraft
were still susceoti le of being opposed by conventional lr
defense methods. The German V-l and V-2 missiles were ackno
edged as a threat but their long-range implications were vague.
For the forseeable future the United States would rely u on
an atomic bomb delivered by conventional means as its strategic
mainstay.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey made the
conclusions thatl (1) strategic bombing brought the German
War economy to the point of collapse, (2) that this result
came very late In the war, too late to develop full potential
with regard to effects on ground and naval forces, and (3) with
better understanding, especially target selection, results
would nave come sooner."
The United States emerged from the w- r, then, with a
f irly intact ..ihiloso hy of strategic bombing with t e Army
ir Corps as its custodian for the following reasons: (1)
the size of the weaoon required a large vehicle for delivery
at strategic rarges, (2) the Army Air Corps had developed
these vehicles, the tactics, and the delivery system, (3)






intricate saf t reoautlons of itomgi and hs* dling made them
the logioal oossessor, «.nd (4) t^ey had had the initial possession
9
of It. 7
After ro ighly two years of desultory and obscure de-
velopment of strategic capability hampered by demobilization
and drastically reduced defense budgets, the cot temporary
controversy over national security oolicy blossomed forth dur-
19^8-19*19 • Proponents of the B-36, the ultimate in recip-
rocating long-range aircraft collided head on with fravy interests
which advocated an attack carrier construction jrogram in a
ti e of reduced budgets. This brought to a head the necessity
for tne selection of the defense strategy that the United
States would settle on. The administration had decided that
it would not afford what it considered duplicative strategies
within the Army and the Navy, and then the Air Force.
The proponents of air oower and a se >arate nir Force,
w ich w s -stablished as an autonomous service in 19^-7 • main-
tained that the bomber and co sequently the Air Force, was
going to become the United States* unchallenged orotector.
However, the Navy and tne Army thought that this concept of
reliance on one form of o fense and/or defense should be
challenged, and c^uld be challenged quite successfully. This




selection of a national strategy and consequently the size
and mix of forces to implement it. Tne basic argument remains
to this day, and although Its effects have been somewhat
alleviated by increased defense expenditures, there is a
hard core of supporters on each side who continue to resist any
dilution of their strategy by t e presence of what they con-
sider to be other over-lathing or duplicative strategies.
The National "illtary Establishment, brought Into
beln.pr by the National Security Act of 19^7 » was experiencing
growing ->ains which centered on the inter-servlce rivalry.
An Indication of the bitterness involved is su rested by
Jaes Forrestal, the first secretary of Defense. "Badford
particularly aroused Symington's and Norstad's ire by asking
what foundation there was for the Air Forces to believe that
there was a place in the war of the future for a strategic
force. **0 Radford aonarently based this glib remark on the
Air Corps* wartime difficulties in Europe, their belated
development of long-range fighters, and the virtual destruc-
tion of Jaoan without materially effecting the serious fighting
which was still in orocess in the Pacific Theatre,
Forrestal attempted to remain objective trough this
period of unification, definition of missions, and selection
of strategies. He firmly su ) orted the administration and was
10Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (Kew Yorki
Viking, 195D. P« 225.
--
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convinced of the necessity for civilian supremacy within the
v ior.fil security machinery. As early as 19^5» while still
crrtary of the Navy, he had said*
Both the Army nd Navy are aware th it they are not
makers of policy but they have a responsibility to de-
fine to the makers of policy what they believe are
military necessities of the United States both for its
own defense and for the implementation of its responsi-
bility for maintenance of world oe ce.
Forrestal's great contribution was to mold the United
States* oost-war de'ense establishment into a viable, effective
organization at a tl e when suoh subjects were eminently un-
ilar with the general oublic. His tragedy is that he did
not su.vive to see the organization out to its first test in
Korea, tie was preoccupied with the organization of the De-
partment, feeling that if the proper one was established and
made effective, a successful national defense policy would
emerge as a logical consequence. To this end he not only held
firm oonvlctions on what that strategy should be, he worked
for the ©mtieAence of that strategy by laboring to define the
missions of the services within the Department.
Molding a Defense Establishment during the period ly^5-
19^9* as was mentioned earlier, was hampered by budgetary
limitations, Forrestal realised thlst
As long as we can out produce the w >rld, can control
the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb, we
can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable in an




of power-military >ower-and to eliminate some of the
conditions which breed war.l^
3ut In implementing this strategy he was susceptible
to Jiavy arguments which advocated balanced forces and which
seriously doubted the success of the long-range aircraft to
bring an enemy to his knees. "The most urgent strategic and
tactical problem to be solved by the Air Force Is the question
of usefulness and capabilities of the long-range bomber against
.let fighter and radar defense. "13 And on the subject of
balanced forces he quoted General Marshall, then the Secretary
of State, as saying "that the trouble was that we are olaying
with fire while we have nothing to out it out.**^
The service rivalry was oarticularly painful in view
of the fact that the Air Force received the lion's snare of
the budget throughout the period. If strategic capability
was the key to increased appropriations, the other two services
wanted their shares. The J£ey West Agreement in March, 1^48,
would have hopefully mediated these differences, but it was
unsuccessful. As a consequence of that conference, Forrestal
had explicitly laid out the missions of the services with an
eye towards balanced forces.
6. Function of strategic bombing is the Air Force's.
12 Ibid. , ->. 350. l^Ibid. , >• 373.
1 3rbid. f o. 355.
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7. The Navy Is to have the Air necessary for its
mission, but its aliasion does not include the creation
of a strategic Air Force. 1 5
However, the Air Force objected to the Key west
.
^res-
men t because it set a li nit of JO Groups on its bomber force,
and the Navy opposed it because it was relegated to a on rely
su->oortlng role.
As a result of the ineoncluslveness of the conference
at Key West, Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs met again, this
ti e at Newport during late August, 19^8* In substance the
conferees agreed on three points. First, the Chief, armed
Forces Sneclal Weaoons Project would reoort to the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. T ; is, in essence, gave full control
of atomic weaoor.s to the Air Force. Secondly, the ^rim^
mission of the Air Force was reiterated. It was that of
atonic borbing. The Air Force, further, had authority to
utilize any strategic bombing capabilities that the Na^ry might
develo . Third, in order to nronerly evaluate wea >or<s systems
in ooeration and those in research ano development, a i.eaoons
Systems Evaluation Group was established to assist in the
selection of weapons systems b providing comparative data on
their cost, effectiveness, and potential! ties. 16
Even though these were strong unequivocal statements,
Forrestal was attempting to define the missions of the services,
1 5ibld.
,
o. 391 i^ibid ., P« W.
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and especially that of the newly formed Air force. This must
not be confused with his desire to h ve balanced forces avail-
able to implement United states strategy. On this subject
he told the President that!
With referen e to the budget (Fiscal Year 19^9) » I
said on the 14,4- billion ceiling limitation we would
probably h^ve the caoability only of reorisal against
any possible enemy, in the form of air warfare, using
England as a base. 1 ?
Previously he had written that reduced expenditures
within the Defense Establishment prevented the development
of balanced forces and posed a calculated risk.
At the present time we are keeping our military ex-
penditures below the levels which our military leaders
must in good conscience estimate as the minimum whioh
would in themselves ensure national securit . By so
doing we are able to ii crease our expenditures to assist
iurooean recovery. In other words we are taking a cal-
culated risk in order to follow a course which offers a
prospect of eventually achieving national security and
also long-term world stability. 18
Further, considering the Fiscal Year 19^9 budget in
his diary i Forrestal wrote in late October, 1948, after his
oonversat* on with the president quoted above th t:
I do not believe that air power alone can win a war
any more than an Army or naval power can win a war, and I do
not believe in the theory t t an atomic offensive will
extinguish in a week the will to fight. I believe air
er will have to be a^olied massively in order to
really destroy the industrial oo >lex of any nation and,
in terms of oresent capabilities, that means air oower
within fifteen hundred miles of the targets -- that means








fields exist -- that means, In turn, there has to be
security of the sea lanes provided by the nsval forces to
get the Array there. Then, and only then, can the tremen-
dous striking nower of air be ftp lied in a decisive — and
I repeat decisive -- manner. 19
The Key West and Newoort Agreements were attempts to
co-—>ro"ise the differences bet I n the services, but they
were unsuccessful. At best they only delayed the controversy
over the orooer selection and mix of weaoons systems to im -le-
ment national strategy. The formulation of the Fiscal 19*4-9
defense budget, with the subsequent appropriations hearing,
reopened the controversy. Navy dissatisfaction concer lng
the direction of United States strategy culminated in the
"Revolt of the Admirals,** which was triggered by cancellation
ot the aircraft carrier U; S3 and the corresoondlng
increased procurement of B-J6*b.^
Navy planners regained convinced that national security
would not best be gained by recourse to a single weaoons
gystea and es~"Cially such a single ouroose weapon as the
strategio bomber with its inherent vulnerabilities. The
-ler, tie-.- reasoned, ssed the advantages of mobility
oounled with a striking nower equal to I lanned Air Po" ce
strategic striking- force.
However, the school of strategic thinking which was to
19lbid.
, p. 51k
2°Henry A. Kissinger, frucle apqhs and Foreign
Policy (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958) t P • 26-2?.
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advocate and support a single purpose strategic force for
United States defense was gaining in strength and popularity.
Continued travel along this road would lead to reliance upon a
strategy of deterrence. The definition of the political
objectives of such a strategy, however, was not to be ex-
pounded explicitly until after the apparent failure of the
Korean Ivar.
The beginnings of the debate concerning the American
strategic dilemma centered, in 19^9* on the decision whether
to resort to strategic, that is atomic, retaliation or whether
to maintain a mixed capability. 19^9 was Another austere year
both in budgets and in force levels. The political situation
was clouded and aggrevated by Chiang Kal-check's defeat and
retareat to Taiwan, with the attendant emergence of the Chinese
People's Republic on the mainaland. This blow to American
prestige and policy, coupled with the Eftftt European Communist
consolidation certainly highlighted a need for a reaporaisal
of American foreign policy. Furthermore, the Greek-Turkish
Aid program of 19^7 « and the formation of the fort . Atlantic
Treaty Organization in 19^9. highlighted the fact that mili-
tarily and politically the United states was becoming increas-
ingly committed abroad. The problem was whether the United
States would be capable of backing up its commitments with
military force where it could conceivably be required and in




During this same ye r, in September, 19^9 » President
Truman announced that t -)Viet. Union had ex -loded an atomic
device. This event, three years early according to the sci-
entists* predictions, only he jrhtened the arguments while, at
the sane time, the event introduced a note of hysteria into
the debate. Up until V is tine the U ited St&t-s atoralo mono-
poly had seemed to assure that the Soviet Union would not act
aggressively in direct confrontation with the United otates
Interests. Mow the Soviet Union had an atomio bomb and. an
existing delivery system comparable to that of the mited
States. * For the first time In American history since the
War of 1812, policy planners had to take into account the
vulnerability of the territorial United States. 22 This fact
was bound to have a profound psychological impact on t
American citizen. 1 Strategic Air Command (SAC) was not
only the guardian of the free world, It was now the guardian
of the veritable existence of the United states. ^3
-l.Karry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry £u Truman g Years
of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), II, p. 30?.
ccRobert 2. Osgood, Limited War J The Challenge to
American Strategy (Chloagoi The University of Chicago Press,
1*57) t P. 190
23The following table of achievements is presented at
this )oint in order to provide historical perspective. It
is oartially drawn froms John Luckacs, A History of the




The North Korean aggression of June 25, 195° » which
trig ered United States entry 1 to the Korean war can be
viewed from the >oint of view of a logical extension of the
Truman Doctrine of 19^7, and as being a contradiction of the
outcome of the controversy of 19^9 • On the o e hand I
United States intervened because of its com itment to South
Korean independence, the strategic proximity of Japan to
Korea, and the implicit su oort of a policy of containment.
On the Other hand. United States conventional military forces
had steadily declined in strength and readiness since 19^5»
due to budget austerity and a growing reliance on strategic
bombardment forces,
Hegardless of the academic arguments of Intervention,
the United States com itted herself to a limited war and her
preparation, not to s >eak of her sycholo^ioal adjustment to
intervention, was debatable.
During 1950-1951 • the administration stepped-up at<~
o reduction and in 1952* the ydrogen, or Thermonuclear, de-
vice was successfully tested. Other than these two develop-
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first two years of the Korean War, aowever, there is one
footnote and that Is that the Air Force, at this Doint in
ti e, and not of its own volition, became committed to the
licy of alror ft priority that was not to be modified or
skived until medium and long range missiles became operational
and the services were suoported by larger conventional warfare
budgets. During the Korean war the first-line bombers, in this
case tne B-3& a*id lat r t e B-47» were to be reserved for
strategic missions, and the obsolescent or replaced bomber,
the B-29, was therefore available for tactical conventional use.
Much as in World War II, the Air Force was caught in
the dilemma of forces versus doctrine. The Air Force had won
the strategic bombardment argument; however it did not have
the forces necessary to retain th-^t capability indenendently
of its tactical commitment. In the case of the Korean War
the taot-ic^l ooaaltaant was sacrificed in favor of retention of
a full strategic capability. 2 **'
-^As early as 195°t though, it was debatable exactly
how much a B-36 tyoe of aircraft would hive contributed to
the prosecution of the war. This was the first cle r-cut case
that the evolution of Air Force strategic vehioles was pro-
ceeding to the development of a truly si gle puroose weapon,
eltomlzed by the IC3M. In 19&5, the same logic may be applied




The controversial strategic defense policy that be-
came known as the doctrine of Massive Retaliation was set
forth by the B« ablican administration during 1952-1953.
*
However, the new President, Dwight D. Elsenhower, was never
as voluble a spokesman of policy ac was his Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles. The Eisenhower method of executive con-
trol was by a st-^ff ap roach, in BOB* ways similar to the
process of determining solutions to command problems in the
Army. Therefore, Dulles as the Secretary of State, had almost
sole responsibility for the determination of recommendations
concerning foreign policy and for their dissemination.
It was Dulles who formulated the doctrine of Massive
Retaliation and who concluded the series of trea ies which
ilemented the policy of containment. Massive Retaliation
in his estimation was to be the organ of nunishment wielded
against the Communists for any infract. ons on their part of
the containment agreements. Massive Retaliation was to be,
lLowe, op_. olt . , o.9» A shorthand statement of the
t eoretical modifications of Utoolan strategic concepts in-
oludesi strategic bombing (19^-5-19^9) » alr-atonlc mower
(19^9-195^) » new look (1953) » massive retaliation (195**-
1957) t limited nuclear war (1^54-1961), oounterforce (1958-
1963)* controlled thermonuclear wac (1962), and controlled
ce (1963).

3initially, the s>le organ of punish . However, the doctrine
was never utilized ooerat ionally though the policy of con-
tainment was given repeated serious tests.
The doctrine In this pure form was abandoned as early
as 195^» though United States defense policy was not officially
altered until 1955. At that time the > or more balanced
forces within the Defense Department became a requirement for
the effective orosecution of United States policy. The De-
fense Department thnt Porrestal had moulded, fortunately, was
csn^ble of producing and organizing these forces. Had the
sunoorters of complete reliance UDOn air power had their way,
the Jnlted States would have be n unable to develop balanced
armed forces without a major reorganization of the Defense
De.-. rt tent.
By the end of the decade of the fifties, the United
States had developed those balanced forces and the national
defense policy that could utilize them effectively. Massive
Retaliation was still present, as it is today , bat its role
was relegated to bein;.: th t of the ultimate reoourse. It was
now, rather khan being the sole instrument of response, one
form of Tvailable responses*
John Foster Dulles and the iMjclesr o o oly
John Foster Dulles, as his family before him, served
the United States through a long and distinguished govern-
ment care r. Though a depublican, he had served the State
-
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Department well during the two years whleh preceded the
Eisenhower victory of 1952 • He had been the orimary Instru-
nt in concluding the Jaoanese Peace Treaty and the first of
a series of "acific security treaties.
In his caoacity as Consultant t • Secretary he also
made foreign -•olicy statements which were somewhat outside the
ere of his resnonsibility and which were t variance with
the adnlnistr t on*s slides. In these he was preoccupied
with the oroblem of containment of Communist power, and with
the means to defeat it should that become necessary. 4s early
as late 19^9 » he had begun advocating the policy that would
beoome known as the doctrine of Massive Retaliation,
He first advocated the policy in December, 19^9 • in an
address in Rew York in which he discussed United States poli-
cies t -> counter th -"unist threat and the direction that he
believed these policies should t£ ke in order to successfully
prosecute the Cold War. "When it comes to strategic illtary
st terry, the free world seems momentarily, in a mood of some
confusion and without any agreed deterrent."^
He then went on to discuss the policy of encirclement
^An address made before the American association for tae
United Nations at New York, Hew York, on December 29, 19^9»
quoted ln» Jo ,n Foster Dulles, "Where Are We? A Five-Year
Reoord of America's Response to the Challenge of Communism,"
Department of State Bulletin , KXXV-602 (January 15i 1950),
nam
3<*
by stating th t
i
.tough economic and Dolitical vigor, enough military
strength, and enough will to resist so that these areas
cannot be c I ly conquered by subversive methods, by
trumped up "civil wars," or even by satellite attacks.
That leaves to be dealt with the oossibillty of full
scale attack by the Soviet Union itself. As against that
there is only one effective defense, for us and for others.
That is the capacity to counterattack. That is the ulti-
mate deterrent.
When I was In the derate working for the ratification
of the North Atlantic Pact, I took the position that it
did not commit the United States to the land defense of
any particular area; it did com it us to action, but
aotlon of our own ohoosing rather than action that an
aggressor could dictate to us.
3
Dulles also considered the limited war- in Korea as
bein? such an ex \ le. In Korea the United States had to fight
a limited wa^ in a limited ceograohio area, at the time, and
with the methods chosen by the communists. Korea was utilized
as an example of the futility of trying to counter each
Communist aggression. It handed ver the initiative to the
Co~;mmlsts in each Instance. Dalles would retain that in-
itiative by selective ~esoonse; selective in tine, place,
and method.
With more than 20 nations strung alor- 2 f OO
miles of Iron Curtain, it is not possible to build up
static defense forces which could m tioa im-
pregnable to such a major and unpredictable assault as
Russia could launch. To attempt t It would be to I
strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere.
Against sue Military >owar as the Soviet Union oan
marshall, collective security defends u ;on capaolty to




our strategic air foroe and our stock of weapons as con-
stituting an arsenal of retaliation.^
The month oreviously he had spoken clearly of the threat
of riusslan imperialist aggression, and outlined what he con-
sidered to be the best method for the containment and neutrali-
zation of the Communist threat.
How do we stop that? The old fashioned way would be
to try to build enough military Strang th in eaoh country
to check on the snot, any armed attack which the Russians
might launch.
Let the free nations combine to create a striking
force of great >ower and then rely more upon the deterrent
of that ounishing oower, and less and less uoon a series
of many local area defenses.
It must, of course, also be made clear that that
punishing power will never itself be an offensive threat
or strike except in retaliation for open, unprovoked
,;ression.5
The presidential election of 1952, boded 111 for the
incumbent party. As the rieoubllcan party's foreigh policy
spokesman, Dulles continued to advocate and harden the policy,
which in another year would become known and the doctrine of
Kasslve retaliation. In May, 1952* in a national magazine, he
published an article that was to receive wide publicity, and
in whioh he described the national defense ooiicy which'The
^Address made before the American Association for the
United Nations in December, 195^» quoted in: John Foster
Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Foreign
Policy," Foreign Affairs , XXXVI- 1 (October, 1957). P« 30.
5Address made before the Advertising Council in Detroit,
Michigan, in November, 1950* quoted ins John Foster Dulles,
"Can -.e oto nusslan Imoerialism?" Department of State Bulletin ,
XXV-650 (December 10, 1950), pp. 939-^0.
-
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ilsenhower administration was Initially to rely on.
There Is one solution and only one: that is for the
free world to develop the will and organize the means to
retaliate instantly against open aggression b ned armies,
so that, If it occurred anywhere, we could and would
strike back where it hurts, by means of our own choosing.
The cumulative weight of these deterrents has proved
great. It could be made overwhelming by the creation of
a coir'unity ounishing force known to be ready and reso-
lute to retaliate, in the event of any armed aggression,
with weapons of Its choosing against targets of its
choosing at times of its choosing.
6
This was the heart of Massive retaliation. Dulles
subsequent! / s->oke of the doctrine essentially in unaltered
terms from these, and as a concise statement of the doctrine
it was never improved upon. The United States, rather tnan
attempting to stem the tide of Communism at points where it
t attempt to break out of the line of containment, would
go directly to tne cause of the outbreak. It would no longer
be satisfied with coping with the individual effects of im-
perialistic G ' isj. Given adequate provocation, the United
States would choose the targets, the weapons, and the times
of retaliation. Unquestionably, local forces would provide
enough esistarce to indicate the unaaibiguity of the Communist
intentions, while the massive retaliatory force, the United
States Strategic Air Command, would provide the response. It
would deal with the causes.
6john Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness, * Life ,




In this respect Massive Retaliation was a rigid doc-
trine. It would not countenance fighting a series of small
or limited wars, but would escalate directly to Passive re-
taliation as the form of response to any aggression.
The majority of the criticism of this doctrine in its
early stages hinged on exactly that point. Dulles, by an
arbitrary decision, made in response to wnat could be an in-
igl ifleant challenge to tne line of containment, could
plunge the world into an atomic war.
Dulles, however, and as his supporters believed, had
formulated thil doctrine in response to the frustrations of
the Cold War. Comnunism, to them, was a relentless and grasp-
ing foe who was insensitive to the normal amenities of diplo-
macy, and who repeatedly provoked local unrest In order to
consolidate and spread its area of domination. Dulles thought
t^at to ,T-eet each and every snail crisis would be a futile
policy that would spread the free world defense effort too
thinly, and which would therefore bankrupt United States de-
fense efforts. The solution was to draw the containment line
which wo ild encircle Communism, and rely on United States
Massive Retaliatory power to contain Communism.
However, reliance on terms such as "at times and places
of o.ir own choosing 11 raised many questions, whom do you bomb,
and do you send them an ultimatum to cease and desist before





first, ore -su nosing that the bluff would not stick. It is
btful whether the Jnited States world resort to these
ultimatums. Even though there was 9 seg er<t of ooinlon which
believed the United States might as well call the Soviet's
bluff and get it over wlth. f
At the same time Dulles was making statements inferring
a desird oolicy of liberation which was not so well defined.
Later these two doctrines would be shown to be contradictory
In operation. However, for \ resent the United States was
caught up in election oolitlcs while fighting a distasteful
war.
In 1953» the Korean War came to a close and the oountry's
leadership changed hands. What were the considerations that
turned the United States to a oolicy of Massive retaliation?
What ingredients inspired the New Look? Broadly speaking they
can be divided into psychological, military, and political
aspects.
Probably the major psychological reason for embracing
such a one-sided oolicy was the generally felt revulsion to-
wards the Korean War. To this was added, in 195^» the lesson
of the Indoc ; irese War. T^is was t>o~>ularly known as the "Kever
Again Club." The United States turned its back on the lessons
?Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism ; A Study in
Politics and Foreign 'olicy Since 195"> (Mew Yorki The Ronald
Press Co-many, 1956), pp. 16^-61.
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of the war. The pre onderant feeling was one of not desiring
again to com: it that much conventional, particularly round,
strength to resistance in that for , j rticularly at the ex-
pense of the American psyche. The inconclusive results of
the War went against the cental gi-ain of the American paopIs
who traditionally have be-n victory conscious.
Another aspect of the New Look is tha contradictory and
usually confusing i age we have of the figure of Dulles, even
after these few short years. Was he really com itted to a
personal battle with Communism as a choice between good and
evil? Did he believe that there was no middle ground of com-
oromise and coexistence? Was he convinced t at it was liter-
ally a waote of time to negotiate with the Communist hier-
archy? Or on the other hand, did he belie e, and convince
President Eisenhower, th :it Massive Retaliation was a rational
oolloy which could effectively cor tain Communism by deterring
ression?
In his Dress conference in December, 1953» Dulles
summed up nis ohilosoohy of containment and deterrence by
stating that: "Today the Soviet Union, with rapidly mounting
atomic r, is deterred froa attacking by the fact that we








Dalles, as the "embodiment of American power," elicited
a olethora of criticism. 9 The criticism, both affirmative
and negative, was very strong, and one of the most significant
reasons that it is difficult to a \-> ->roach the development of
United States strategy during this oeriod objectively is the
partisan character of the commentators. From tne supporters
on the reliance on strategic air oower came unqualified support
for Massive Retaliation and rejection of balanced forces, or
any oth^r defense measure or treaty that wnuld det cxct from
the deterrent or disperse United Stat- s defense efforts from
rt fortress America."
On the other hand, there wore cries of alarm at the
oolicy of total war or nothing, and the advocacy of the belief
that unless the United States w~s willing to meet the Commu-
nist threat with balanced, and therefore realistic, force
structures, eventually the world would be reduced to the two
camps of the territorial United States on the one hand, and a
hostile Oor^unist world on the other.
However, Dulles moulded the defense strategy that he
believed would not only successfully oroseoute the Cold
but would be victorious. Dru^mond and Coblentz have aptly
summed up the ambivalent feelings that we have towards Dulles:
oscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink,
John Foster Dulles 1 Command of American power (Garden City:
Doubled
-y, I960), p. 13.
[-
"It will be a mixed verdict. It will be marked by minuses
and r>luses. t will record that Foster Dulles was an extra-
ordlra rson exercising extraordinary jower in extraordi-
nary times."
Politically, the choice of Massive Retaliation would
again allow tome resoite for the budget but ag^in at the ex-
pense of other, more conventional, forces. One of the Re-
blican campaign oromises had been the advocacy of fiscal
responsibility, and in tnis resoect about half of the Republi-
can budgets during the next two administrations were balanced.
The administration subscribed to the long haul view in
the fipht with Communism. They cancelled some defense contracts
of duplicative items and in general stretched out the build-
up of forces in anticipation of an indefinite period of uneasy
->eace. The world in the mind of the policy maker in 1953t
was truly bl-polar. Massive Retaliation would put t e gun
against the enemy's head, and so far there was still only one
head an^ one gun, which simplified the problem.
Furthermore, the military arguments ran, trie huge
Russian army backed by a seemingly bottomless manpower >ooi
made adherents of conventional land forces appear rather short-
sighted. At a signal, theoretically, the 150 Russian army
divisions in Europe could march straight to the English Channel.
10 Ibid.. ->. 12
5 '-,*';
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All that the United States n eded was enoi^h of a ground force
in Europe, either American or indigenous, which could orovlde
enough conventional resistance to indicate the unambiguous-
ness of Communist Intentions. These forces preferably would
be local defense forces. Dulles stated in early 195^ th t:
"There is no local defense which alone will contain the nighty-
land power of the Communist world. Local defense must be re-
inforced by the further deterrent of Massive .-:etaliatory
^er,'1' 11 In the same vein President Eisenhower stated in
a press conference th^t, "If you could win a big one, you would
certainly win a little one. "12
The argument ran that the United States 1 most orecious
asset was manpower and therefore tne number of men used in
warfare must be reduced. For this loss in manoower would be
substituted >owe , s^eed, mobility and flexibility.
This, then, logically led into the theorura of disen-
gagement. United States forces would not be deployed, by
commitment, to any specific ^lace; therefore they would be
available to go anywhere. In a ^ure deterrent environment
there would not be any deployed or deiloyable conventional
forces.
Though Clausewitz stated that >olicy has to control
^-William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara strategy (New York*





o-erations, In 1953 it was felt by strategic planners that
advance of technology had made it inor< asinly difficult
If not imoossible to limit wars politically. The uniqueness
of modern weapons systems was out of the realm of conventional
armaments. Massive Retaliation could b'come a substitute
for diplomacy. This logic fell ea ily into place in Dulles*
mind in view of his onlnion of the Communist world.
Needles* to say, the effects of and ramifications upon
United States allies of these arguments were demoralizing to
an extreme.
Militarily the arguments for Massive retaliation were
oriticized vehemently. But the advooates of Massive Retalia-
tion forwarded the assumptions that: (1) Russia has a large
air force of comparable ability to that of the United States;
(2) they have an immense army, well t ained and with modern
equinmentj and (3) their navy is of modest size with the ex-
ception of th« submarine force which to many observers meant
t
-t the United States tlavy, and especially the aircraft
rrier.T, would quickly be destroyed in the initial stages of
a war.
Thus, at the end of 1953» Massive xtetaliation as a
->h3 losonhy and as a national defense policy had briefly lelled.
It was defined as the ability to ore vent war by threat of atomic
annihilation. owever, the doctrine was bound to break down
due to its inherent inflexibility and the oontint 3d emergence
-.
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and fall realization of Russian comoarable strategic capa-
bility, Soviet counter-deterrence emerged In the form of a
fine medium Jet bomber. ^ Due to the availability of this
Russian strike force the United States deterrent force would,
therefore, in all probability be deterred fro^ resorting to
Massive Retaliation in lesser aggressions or nrovooations.
The United States had mainly lost the initiative with resoect
to strata lc bombardment. Later this was to be borne out in
the Hungarian Revolt an ; the Suez crisis. The theory of Mas-
sive Retaliation was breaking down; it was not the whole answer.
Kuolear Bl-polarity and the Approaching Stalemate
In the f ce of the develooment of a Russian strategic
atomic bombardment capability would the United States counter-
force be credible? Modern weapons systems, in this case the
strategic striking force, had suffered a loss of the defensive
function which had been an inherent capability of a major
o fensive force. That is, regardless of the responsiveness,
speed, and accuracy of United States offensive forces, they
co lid not defend the United States from a similar attack.
Offensive oower alone, in 195^» constituted deterrence as it
does today, because the defensive capability lags immeasura-
bly. Barring unforseen technological developments the United
1 Seville Brown, Nuclear Was ; the lm ending Deadlock




and full realization of Russian comoarable strategic capa-
bility, Soviet counter-deterrence emerged in the form of a
fine medium jet bomber. ^ Due to the availability of this
Russian strike force the United States deterrent force would,
therefore, in all probability be deterred from resorting to
Massive Hetaliation in lesser aggressions or provocations.
The United States had nlainly lost the initiative with respect
to strategic bombardment. Later this was to be borne out in
the Hungarian Revolt and the Suez crisis. e theory of Mas-
alve Hetaliation was breaking down; it was not the whole answer.
Nuclear Bl-polarity and the Aporoacr i:. otalcmate
In the f ce of the develooment of a Husslar. strategic
atomic bombardment capability would toe United St counter-
force be credible? Modern weapons systems, in this case the
Strategic striking force, had suffered a loss of the defensive
function which had been an inherent capability of a major
o fensive force. Th t is, regardless of the responsiveness,
speed, and accuracy of United States offensive forces, they
co ild not defend the United States from a similar attack.
Offensive oower alone, in 195^» constituted deterrence as it
does today, lse the defensive capability lags immeasura-
bly. Barring unforseen technological developments the united
1 Seville Brown, Nuclear Wag ; the impending Deadlock





States would be, In the Interim, liable to intolerable damage.
The imoact of this uoon the national security image and the
formulation of national security policy has been penetrating,
far reaching, and still haunts strategists at the ^resent time,
a decade later.
For defense planners this meant that as hopeless as it
might seem the defense must be attempted. The United States
has in 170 metropolitan areas, 75 £>er cent of its industrial
capacity and 55 P«r cent of its population. In the event of
nuclear attack there is less warning time as trie attack would
be directed initially against the United States, There is little
or no warning, or no buffer action. The duration of the attack
w-'ld be quite short, the value of shelters is hi hly debata-
ble, and the added dimension of radioactivity is added as a
cont ir.uing merace. Furthermore, the lethal destructive di-
ameter of the H-bomb has made targeting academic. One could
not only wioe out whole cities but also the contiguous indu-
trial complexes.
The United States, therefore, embarked upon a series of
defensive measures which consist d of overse s radar installa-
tions and the North American Air Defense Command (KOHAD)
system of the DEW, Pine Tree, Mid-Canada linea and the SAGE
system coupled with metropolitan radar and missile coverage.
One of the Drimary, though less publicized, reasons for these
systems was to orotect the vulnerable SAC fore These de-

^6
ferslve systems o he defined as strate^ Lo l iey were
to -revent th; enemy frou de ' j«s retaliatory c
hil 1 ty by surprise. General LeMay stated In ly57 t "JhC'i
residual >unch must be able to deter the enemy. "I*4, cen»
LeMay Mant b bhli bh t the enemy riever be ah
assume th^t he will be ca .able of re »s strlk
aolty to a level that could be defended against by him, or
that would be small enough to deliver to Ilia an aoc«->tah
level
The doctrine of Massive on as the sol
of response to crisis or islon was subjected t a«-
ln verse criticism s t active enemy c<
develop a si liar strat-glc capability, The crl Uolsm was
y based on the fact that no. * the Unit* itee no
lor lad an atomic monopoly, It was necessary to deve*
mox f] xlble ar -r.jclear methods of rea onse, beoause
United States J be subject to nuclear elthei
preventive or retail er.
In the fl< Id ol >1 security, we have rigidly
pursued patterns which may h « ve *te when they
were developed but which have become d ted
In the lnterva] .15
l^Paul i eeters,
Critics (C
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This was first shown to be s ecificaily evident in the
case of reduced European co ventional defense forces.
To attempt to maintain the doctrine of massive retalia-
tion in the face of these developments (Russian land po-
wer and str teglc nuclear capability) by deliberately
leaving a vital area Inadequately defended is to conduct
a policy of reckless bluff.
These arguments were germalne and to the ooint. But
Dulles also, * early as 195^s *as beginning to perceive the
rigidity of his policy and to acknowledge the requirement for
rs flexibility.
But such power (the SAC deterrent), while now a domi-
nant factor, may not have the same significance forever.
Furthermore, massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation
is not the kind of oowsr wriich could most usefully be
evoked under all circumstances.
borne suggested that the U.S. intended to rel;, wholly
on large-scale strategic bobbing as the sole me ns to
deter and counter aggression. What has already been
said should disoose of tnis erroneous idea. The potential
of massive attack will alvrays be kept in a state of instant
diness, but our orogram will retain a wide variety in
the means and sco-e for responding to aggression.
To deter aggression, it is lmnortant to have the flexi-
bility and the facilities which '-ike various responses
available. In many cases any ooen assault by Communist
forces could only result in starting a ge But
the free world must have the seant for resoondi rig effectively
on a selective basis when it chooses. It must not ?ut
itself in a position where the only response o:>en to it
is general war. The essential thing is that a potential
aggressor should know in advance that he san and will be
made tn suffer for his aggresa ore than he can possi-
bly gain from it. This calls for a system in which looal
defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent
er. The method of doing so will vary according to the
character of the various areas*!?
^Ibld .. p. 108. See also pp. 10 5-7 for an excellent
disdussion for the necessity of European conventional defense
f .
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Dulles reiterated the necessity of the desirability of
balanced forces becked ap bv massive retaliatory power later
t t same year.
We must have the capacity to respond at > laces and by
me^ns of our choosing.
This, however, does not mean that any local war would
automatically be turned into a general war with atomic
bombs being droned all over the mao. The essential thing
is that we and oir allies should have the means and the
will to assure that a potential aggressor would lose from
his aggression more than he could win. This does not
me as the aggressor has to be totally destroyed. It
does mean a capacity to InfHot punishing damage. 18
This was the policy of graduated deterrence. The
United States would maintain its retaliatory capability and
its retaliation would be massive with respect to an aggressor's
expected gains. The United States wo ild be able co retaliate
on a selective basis to any ty->e of aggression. Local ag-
gr salone would be deterred at a level of lesser intensity.
Therefore, exnansion of hostilities would be the aggressor's
prerogative and consequently his d^om. There was significantly
less talk about retaliation against the mother countries of
China and Russia, t ou h the threat hat never been withdrawn.
However, the oollcy carte into serious conflict with tie
1? John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Pe ce,"
Foreign Affairs , 32-3 (April, 195*0 > p. 355. 3^3-
loAddress made before the National 4-H Club, quoted in:
John Foster Dulles, "The Goal of Our Foreign Policy," Depart-
ment of State Bulletin. (Decemb r 13, 195*0 » P* 308
-
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capabilities and size of the conventional forces within the
Defense Department. There were not sizable enough forces to
fight another Korea, and they were spread quite thinly through-
out the free world. It was necessary to publicize the oolicy
of graduated deterrence, though, in order to neutralize the
Russian deterrent. If the deterrent on both sides became
mutually deterred, lesser forms of response were the only
recourse.
Our aim, therefore, should be to shun atomic warfare,
primarily because such warfare would Inevitably lead to
total and unlimited war from which no victory and no
stable oolltical results could be expected by anyone.
To achieve this aim, we must paradoxically, maintain
two fundamental capabilities — the capability of waging
an atomic war unequaled in destructiveness by any opponent
and the equally Important capability of waging a victori-
ous war without utilizing atomic weaoons.^5
President Eisenhower wanted it made plain the. t the
United Stat s would never initiate atomic hostilities, 1
further at t rapt to relay to the Russians that nuclear war is
unnecessar .
Above all, its (United States military establishment)
purpose Is to prevent aggression and war. Our forces
will never be used to initlat war against any nation;
they will be used only for the defense of the free world. 20
Though both Eisenhower and Dulles had qualified the
19Hanson W. Baldwin, "Nagasaki Plus Nine Years, H
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , X (October, 195^) » P» 318.
"ITOAddress Side ?.t the Serloan Jewish Tercettennary
Dinner at New York, R.T., on October 2^), 195^» quoted lnj
Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Peace an Freedom," Department of St«= te
Bulletin
.
November 18, 195*0. >• 6? 5.
I
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role of Massive Retaliation in defense str tegy, the criti-
cises c-vtlnued because force structures did not reflect th<
shift.
Is hypothesis exercised by weaoons of mass destruction
by making military strategy too dependent on one set of
tools, has deprived the nation of flexibility. With a
ri 1 llltary strategy, no policies can be formulated and
no objectives can be acnleved which cannot be im .'lemented
by nuclear destruction. It is one thing to negotiate
through strength; it is quite another to negotiate on tne
bisis of a nower w ich breeds self-destruction. Americans
today are not only power-minded but nuclear power-minded.
Their rigid strategy did not help them in Kore it gave
them little if any additional strength to deal wit bhe
Suez situation, and none for the Hungarian crisis. In a
sense, it has tied their hards by tying their minds to
a single objective: total peace or total war -- deterrence
or self-destruction. 21
And the Navy's position was clearly stated by Commander
Williams 1 writing in March, 1955:
But we must now face a situation in which it is oossl-
ble even for the weaker side to deny victory to the stronger
simply by delivering a sufficient number of nuclear wea-
pons. A nation need not have H su^eriorltyM In atomic air
Dower. It needs only to have enough. 2
Clearly, Massive Retaliation as the orlmary United States
res onse was explicitly abandoned. Both the Secretary of
its and the president had made statements to that effect.
Previous to the Presidents 1955 State of the Union Message,
^lGorden B. Turner and Richard D. Challenger (eds.),
Mational Security In the Nuclear Age (New Yorkj Praeger, I960)
,
P- 6 5. '
"
^zRaloh E. Williams, Jr., "Americans Moment of Truth,"




Dulles in discussing the requirement for mobile forces nec-
essary t"> reinforce the defenses of the Free World had said
th^tj
Therefore we are relying, in most of the areas of the
world, primarily u^on the deterrent of striking power as
an effeotive defense
.
The orocess of building Up a strategic reserve c. land
forces and relying at the front line on sea and air oower,
is a oolloy which we adopted a year ago, and t is
going on now is merely sn anticipation of that policy. 2 3
President Eisenhower followed this by also voicing the li i
tations of Massive retaliation in his State of the Union Ad-
dress j
To orotect our nations and our oeoples from the catas-
trophe of a nuclear holocaust, free nations must maintain
countervailing military oower to persuade the Communists
of the futility of seeking to advance their ends tnrough
aggression. If ths CoT!"nunist rulers understand that Ameri-
ca's resoonse to aggression will be swift and decisive —
that never shall we buy ieace at the expense of honor and
faith — they will b erfuliy deterred from launching a
military venture* engulfing their own peoples and many
others In disaster. Bow this, of course, is a form of
world stalemate. 2 ^
He then defined stalemate t- uslyr
When I said stalemate, I was trying to describe where
neither side is gettl g what it desires in the who
world struggle, but that, at least, have sense enough to
agree that they must not ursue it deliberate!,/ and through
force of arms: that is all. 2 5
2 3secretary of State's Press Conference, Department of
State Bulletin
.
(January 3» 1955) * P* 375
i£





3y the end of 1955» the credibility of the deterrent
had become seriously doubted both within and ithout the
[ministration* The problem that confronted the policy me
m was ty->e of strategy w; uld be effective in deterring
Communism without recourse to total war. The concensus of
o tnion was thst balanced forces were essential. During peace-
time, however, with the emphasis on balanced budget S, these
would be nearly irreconcilable. The previous reliance on
Massive ia t ion and the serious diplomatic setbacks of the
mid-fifties, combined to generate a continuing, titter debate
over the direction of national security policy.
British, French, and Russian Reactions to Massive Retaliation
During this eriod, the British underwent similar
throes in the determination of a national strategy. The
British were committed to NATO and. they were closely tied to
the point of being dependant upon the United States strategic
umbrella. Their debate pivoted on whether they should de-
velop an independent deterrent or restrict their military
contribution to token supplementary forces and capabilities.
In 195^» they had decid d that the initial nuclear holo-
caust would terminate with some of the mobilization base in-
tact, ft r the initial nuclear exchange both sides would
then proceed on a conventional war ba. is to decide the issue.
(1) Any future major war vjlll consist of an initial and
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probably decisive, massive nuclear exchange. The United
States is far ahead in the capability of delivering such
an attack. (2) Since we nave the atomic advantage, we
should limit our ready forces to those required to ooje
with and survive the initial crucial blows, wnich we can
do because of our capacity for instant retaliation. (3)
If we are going to carry out this strategy, we shall i
a high degree of selectivity In the lon^-range develop-
ment of we 3 i systems. These are so expensive that if
we do not want to bankrupt ourselves, I *?e
military forces around weapons systems to further only
the cost essential national tasks; and the allocation
of resources and practices accordingly. 26
This was labelled "broken-back warfare," and a c
that was abandoned in 1955 In favor of a complete reliance on
deterrent capability. The British had also come to the con-
clusion that strategic bombardment would be conclusive with
respect to any organized resistance by conventional forces
barring as yet unforeseen improvements in air defense, civil
defense, or hardening. The switch in British policy was com-
pleted in 1957 t *nd the requirement for a strong British mili-
tary position was accurately described by Bevin In a speech
in October of that year;
t this confe ence (Labor Party Conference), ought
not to do -- and I beg them not to do it row -- is to
decide uoon the dismantling of the whole fabric of British
international relations ios without -rutting anything in
its place. If they carried the resolution (to eliminate
nuclear armament), with all its implications they would
send a British Foreirrn Secretary, whoever he was, naked
into the cor fe . ence chamber."-'
2
^Lowe, op . olt. ., o. 39
2?Kisslnger, Og.. clt . . p. 111.
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The foremost spokesman of the British Utopian school
of thou ht was air John Slessor, who had repeatedly c lied for
a British strategic force as early as 1953* He, like the French
later, believed that even a deterrent caoability which was less
than finite could deter an enemy and could be a force to
reckon with. 2 **
However, in reality, the British had to become recon-
ciled to ths -protection of the American strategic umbrella
for a number of reasors; the orimary of which was economic.
Henry Kissinger has written a ^erce ?tive passage which
vividly ooirts out the differences between British and French
obllosoohles of independent strategies based on nuclear
deterrence.
If the threat of all-out war is the chief counter
to Soviet aggression, none of our allies will be able
to post ar effective retaliatory threat should they create
strategic forces of their own. The result will be elt;
a sense of imootence or irresponsibility, either resig-
nation, or a futile, attemot to achieve an independent
deterrent position. °
Whereas the British went through the logic, similar to
that of the United States, in determining a national strategy,
they reconciled themselves to contributing a supplementary
28sir John Slessor, The Gr-at Deterrent (Kew Yoi
Praeger, 1957) • In Chapter 8 he discusses the plaoe of bombers
in British policy in a lecture delivered in 1953. Chapter 13
is also excellent, as it is a British viewpoint of the philoso-
phy of deterrence. It is strkingly similar in its arguments
to that of air ->ower ourists in the United States.
29Kisslnger, oo. olt
. , p. 5"»
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role in western defense -- interdeoendency. On the other hand
the French, having developed their atomic capability some years
later, remained frustrated by the Insignificance of their
relative oower oositlon and elected to take an independent
course which was •emained a source of frustration to Western
statesmen and str? ts. In order for Western ;:-?fense
efforts to be fully effective individual nation's caoabilities
must be closely coordinated and complementary, and the deter-
mination of str s and their implementation subject to
even more close coordination to the degree that there is a
unified coajand in complete charge of all forces.
However, the French waived the opportunity to parti-
cipate in high Western strategy in favor of pursuing their
version of a finite, or minimum deterrent capability. Their
spokesman was Pierre Gallois, a French military figure given
free rein by De Gaulle to exoound French strategy. Gallois
believed that even ft token nuclear strritep:lcoapabllity was
sufficient to provide a deterrent to the possessor.
Sir.oe Hiroshima, the situation has become totally
different. Because weapons oan now break the back of
a great nation, s small fraction of a country's striking
oower would be enough for a decisive attack. J®
30pierre M. Gallois, "Nuclear Aggression and National
Suicide," The He porter
.
(September 18, 1958), p. 23. The
philosophy supporting the independent French deterrent is
skillfully taken to task in Chanter 4, "The Independent
French Deterrent," inj Aron, oo_. clt .
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Regardless of allied cooperation or divergence in ;ur-
sjlt of am independent strategy, tne outstanding str t lc
fact of life in Ve mid-fifties was the bi-polarity of stale-
mated nuclear oower of the United States and the Soviet Union.
The paramount objective of any state is survival
.
No gain is meaningfully possible without self-oreser-
v:>tion, and to carry this axiom one ste- further: No
gain by attack is -ossible unless it exceeds the losses
incurred in consequence of the attack. The primary
Soviet objective, like our own, is survival. -21
This is a fair appraisal of the attitude prevalent
not only within Russian oolltlcal and military circles, but
within the United States as well. The Soviet Union was at
a considerable disadvantage during the first decade follow-
World War II. Though the United States had recklessly
dismantled its armed forces, the Damoclean sword of the
atomic bomb hung over Russia's head. During that time there
was no feasible military way of neutralizing that threat
^osed by the United States, Russia^ only hone was that by
nolitical maneuvering, the United States would be deterred
from utilizing its ultimate weaoon. Th t -olicy was effective,
and the Russians made significant ost-war gains des.'ite
United states nuclear bombardment capability couoled with
the doctrine of Massive Retaliation*
owever, during the same period, and even after the
3lRaymond L. Garthoff , Soviet Strute^y in the Nuclear
Age (revised edition: New Yorkt Praeger, 19627, r>. 5«
-
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doctrine of Massive Retaliation was modified to graduated de-
terrence, the -ussi ,ns suffered from their strategic impotency.
The dominant Soviet image of American military strategy
is a massive, surprise air blow I th weaoons of mass
destruction (nuclear, thermonuclear, and bactez iological)
?derived primarily against Soviet urban-industrial centers.
^
*In iMarch, 195^t some persons (Mikoyan and Malenkov)
In the Soviet Union stated quite unmistakably that the Soviet
'Jnion -assessed a deterrent capability. H 33 The development of
Soviet military strategy subsequent to their acquisition of a
strategic nuclear caoabillty was similar to their orevious
conventional strategy. Russian early strategy was to con-
centrate on the armed forces of the eneiiy rather than to
resort to attacks on urban-industrial complexes. Their first
strategy was that of counter-force.
A strategic concept underlies and welds together into
a coherent and inter-related oattern all aspects of doc-
trine, organization of the military establishment, weapons
systems and other components of any llitary struct-
ure. The Soviet strategic concept, in the thermonuclear
era as before, Is founded on the belief that the primary
objective of military operations Is the destruction of
hostile military forces, and not the annihilation of the
economic and population resources of the enemy. 3^
As American air power purists maintained later, an
effective counter- force strategy may require recourse. to pre-
32 Ibid.
, p. 129.
33M 6 rbert S. Dinerstein, war and the Soviet Union ;
Nuclear weapons and the Hevolutlo- in Soviet military and
Political Thinking (New York: Praeger, 1959) » pi 15.
3**r,arthoff t oo. clt . . p« 71.
-
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vertive or pre-emptive attaoks in order for it to be effective
and credible. Since the Soviet Union had lived with the fear
of such an attack for a decade they readily incorporated the
conceit into their strategy.
The Soviet Union has to be e *ared to deal a fore-
stalling blow so as to deorlve the ener.y of the advan 1
of surprise. e image called up is that of a quick de-
cisive blow against the enemy, who is ooised to strike,
before he can launch his own attack. 35
But as the stalemate matured in the later fifties, their
strategy gradually evolved into one similar to hat of the
United States, iieailzing the infeasibllity of an effective
counter- force strategy, Russian strategy evolved into one of
deterrence based on some counter-force capability, but it was
composed largely of counter-city targeting. This, in trn,
was mixed with a large conventional force capability in the
Russian tradition. Russian strategy is epitomized by the
tary that: "Khrushchev's bent seems to lie in the di-
rection of concentrating on weapons with maxim;;:; olltlcal
effect and a high probability of discouraging war from st rting
in the first place." 36




36v.d. Sokolovskli (ed.), Soviet ill tary Strategy ,
translated with an analytical introduction, annotations and
supplementary material by Herbert S. Dinerstein, Leon Gore,




s iere apart with roughly equivalent deterrent forces and
similar strategies. Their respective deterrents were credible
and their forces stalemated. The rassiars had aspired, at a
minimum, to neutralization of the American strategic nuclear
monopoly, but the Americans were unprepared for the speed
with which the Soviet Union brought this to fruition. As a
result, previous reliance on the nuclear monopoly was now
cancelled out- A new or revised strategy, on the part of the
United states, was required to regain American supremacy,
stalemate was Intolerable.
The Great Debate
The Interval from 1955 to 1959 is considered the peri-
od of the Great Debate. It extended from the time that the
doctrine of Massive Retaliation was repudiated as the sole
method of United States military res >onse, to the ore-election
year of the presidential election of i960, highlighted b the
"missile p-ap."
The debate was three-oornered in its composition. On
l one hand was the administration which was espousing bala-
nced forces and which was attempting to project an image of
responsibility in national defense strategy. The image re-
flected a strategy in cart consisting of massive retaliatory
<er, which, though not perhaps overwhelming, was sufficient
to deter the iussian nuclear force. It was credible. Added




both based within the continental United Stated and deployed
abroad. The components of rational defense were welded to the
free world defense strategy by the treaties which I ented
the containment principle, and mutual defense agreements.
Both the President and the Secretary of State reiterated the
Strength and competence of United States forces which both
ensured deterrence of the Bnesiaa strategic threat and con-
tributed to maintenance of world peace by the ability to
respond in kind to lesser aggressions.
it is also agreed that the principal deterrent to a-
ressive war is mobile retaliatory power* This retalia-
tory :o«er must be vast in terns of its potential. But
-e extent to which it would be used would, of coarse,
depend on circumstances.
It is also agreed that it wo ild be imprudent to risk
everything on one single aspect of military power. There
must be land, sea, and air forces for local action and
for a defense whioh will give mobile striking power the
chance to do its work. 37
We have a broadly based and efficient defensive strangth,
including a great deterrent ower, which is, for the present,
our main guaranty against war.
Now as to the period ahead: Every part of our military
establishment must be equipped and will be equipped to
do its defensive job with the most modern weapons and
methods.
e must maintain all necessary types of mobile forces
to deal with local conflicts, should there be need. This
means farther improvements in equipment, mobility, tactics,
and fira power. 38
37/vddress made before the annual luncheon of the Associa-
ted Press at New York, fc.Y., Aorll 22, 1957, quoted ins John
Foster Dulles, "Dynamic Peace," Department of state Bulletin *
May 6, 1957), p. 38.
38Dwight D. Eisenhower, "State of the Union," Depart-
ment of State 3ulietin, (January 27 , 1958) t P« &5»
'
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Dulles, especially, continuing In his role as the fore-
most s okesman of United States foreign policy, returned
repeatedly to this theme.
It is our olicy to check the Communists* use or threat
of force 07 having retaliatory power and the will to use
it, so that the Coiunists 1 use of force would obviously
be unprofitable to them.
It is, however, not enough merely to nave great re-
taliatory striking ower. It is rieoessary to ^ave forces
in being at endangered points. Nations which are in
close proximity to o erful ag. ressive forces need the
reassurance of some visible force within their own terri-
tory. They are not content to be wholly dependent u .on
forces and decisions elsewhere. Furthermore, vast re-
taliatory power should not be, and will not be, invoked
lightly. There ^ust be an ability to oppose what may
be limited probings In ways less drastic than general
nuclear war. 39
On the other hand were the two other sides to the
»r ;UM t. They v>ere proponents of a traditional mixed force
capability, »nd the s i • orters of pure air oower. The former
largely supported the ad&inlstration but their aftln oritici
was that there was an imbalance in the defense appropriations
structure. In their opinion the &lr Force, and particularly
the comoonent of strategic bombardment, was receiving a dls-
jro .' ortionate share of the defense dollar. They believed
that only a minimum, or finite, deterrent was required, and
that resources in excess of these should be allocated to
39Address made before the Jalifor la Chamber of Com-
merce at San rrancisco, Calif., December 4, 195&* quoted ins
B Foster Dulles, "Policy for the Far Bfc«t t " Department of
State Bulletin, (December 22, 1958), p. 6oi.
•
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cc ventional, mobile forces. "Minimum deterrence as iefi
kh* specialists Is the capability in any circumstances of
inflicti i on an enemy engaged in open aggression such re-
ft llation as he would consider unacceptable m m*Q
In making our retaliatory force secare from enemy
attack, we do not need the rreat numbers of missiles and
bombers. hether the U.0.S..5. . has one-half as many or
several times as rsany missiles as the United States, is
really academic as long as we have the ass ired capability
of destroying Russia and as long as the Soviets know it
and are really convinced of it.-4 *
The Traditionalists were convinced that the perfect
deterrent weapon for the time was the Solaris missile system.
It could move in close, was far less vulnerable, was continu-
ally T.oving, dispersed, and did not need refueling for years,
was difficult to locate and destroy, could not be eliminated
by one assive attack like land power, would draw missiles
away from our homeland, and reduced the possibility or likli-
hood of surprise attack. 2*2
The third corner of the strategic debate consisted of
the air irists, or Utopians, They believed that re-
liance on air power and the missile foroes would ensure not
only t i air tenance of United States security bit victory in
the Cold ,<ar. They were the supporters of a doctrine of
^Aron, o£. clt
. , p. 7km
^lAddress given by Admiral Arleigh Burke to the Chamber








classical iMassive Hetaliation at a time when it had outlived
its usefulness. The advent of mutual deterrence and the
failure of a counter-force strategy, because of its infeasi-
bility, revented them from formulating a realistic alterna-
tive to national defense strategy based on balanced forces.
LoHay could sayj
Our forces, therefore, must be sufficient, prepared and
able to destroy any aggressor's military power to the ex-
tent that he no Ion; er has the will or ability to wa;
war. This is the type of military force we must ait tai —
a counterforce—a force that can win—the kind of mili-
tary force that is essential to true deterre ce.^3
However, such a couter- force strategy could result in
an unending arms race, based on si gle purpose weapons im~
1? -r.ting a single purpose strategy, with its inherent dangers
of Instability. Critics of the Air Force ^oint of view have
maintained that they surr sorted a counter-force strategy in
order to enlarge their forces, aside from the strategy it
supported.
ononents of a counterforce strategy argue that de-
terrence requires not only the prospect of damage to indus-
try and civilian population but also of military defeat.
Consequently, the primary target must be the opponent's
striking forces. Once this is crushed, victory is assured.
A cou -terforce strategy therefore requires a retaliatory
force so large and so well orotected that it can guarantee
the destruction of the oppo&enti offensive power. As the
opposing fissile force grows, ours has to multiply corres-
oondingly and at a ratio which ,ains the possibility
t3Addrosa by Gereral Curtis LeHay given to the Air power
ncil, Port ;orth, Texas, August 26, i960, quoted In Lowe,
•-
. clt . t . 220.
'
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of victory. In the age of nuclear Plenty aid. of mobile
ssiles, the force requirements of a counterforoe stre
cry are likely to become astronomical.^
The Utopian proponent* of preventive war reasoned that
if one attacked first he would fain the advantage, under-
standably and probably decisively. They believed one mi
as veil strike first in view of the fact that war is inevita-
ble. It would be best to strike now before the missis s
reached parity or worse. Countering these arguments were the
ad ocates cf the hope that war is not necessarily inevitable,
or at least the nuclear form of war. Furthermore, they reasoned
that your intelligence night not be entirely reliable, so you
co <ld still end up getting the worst of it. Added to this,
of course, was the oral issue of initiati g hostilities. The
crux of the criticises was that the United States should never
SOW it itself to an inflexible strategy,
A real problen for the planner was that of the pre-
tive attack. Dtllizi g this strategy, the united States
would v launch its attack after the Soviet j.d already
in notion its strategic attack, but before it had been c
summated. Preferably the United States would launch its attack
well before his got underway. s would absolve the United
44Klsslr^er, The Necessity for choice , • 27. See also
Chapter II, ''The Dilemmas of Deterrence,** for an excellent
discussion of the types and options of deterrence, with a very
helpful p-ranh on >ape 30.
:
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States r I , but the Intelligence problem of what consti-
tutes unambiguous warning is very delicate. Reliance on this
form of defense would obviate the need for either hardening
or dispersal. But, by the save token, to be effeotive, this
strategy relied heavi a counter-force caablli;
tive war, on the other hand, can come about even
when the two sides are fairly evenly balanced. It Is a
result of two interacting factors: fear of an imminent
attack and the vulnerability of the retaliatory force. If
a nati Mf r s retaliatory force is highly exposed, it must
live with the i ' t ;are that a successful attack would
place it at the ag ressor's nercy. ;enoe, the less vul-
nerable a country's retaliatory force the less incentive
that country will have for a pre-emptive blow. The mo-
tive for a pre-emptive blow is reduced to & alnlnan if the
retaliatory force is so well protected that It can afford
to ride out an attack &?<d still retain the oapacity to
Inflict unacceptable damage. Sy the mum token, such a
degree of readiness will eliminate the aggressor's Incen-
tive to launch a surprise attack in the first o lace. ^5
Critics of these ar ts pursued the following logica
The alternatives to preventive war, pre-emptive attack, and
Massive retaliation are deterrence and the ability to wage
limited war.
The objective of "graduated deterrence" or selective
force nust be, therefore (as in Gilbert and Sullivan where
"the panish;;ei t fits the orioie"), an entire spectrum of
litary capabilities. e -lust be capable of fighting all-
out nuclear war, small scale brush wars, a limited nuclear
war, and a major non-nuclear war. But, if we want to
survive, we shall avoid, like death, confining our capa-
bilities to any one wea >on, ) e system. I ust be able
to win without i volvlng atomic weapons; if we cannot,
our fate Is sealed. ^6
**5lbld ., p, 17.
^Hansor .. Baldwin, "The ;oe of War,* Bulletin of
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The rejection of the three modes I rlare mentioned
above, co ltted the United States to deterrence and, there-
fore, the integrity, that is the credibility, of i 1 s retalia-
tory forces. This is not really too far removed from . assive
Retaliation so far i 1 its argument. However, it was more
flexible. Deterrence does not deoend upon superiority, it
was further argued, it is relative and this is particularly
so with nuclear wea ms. The deterrent comnonent of the
strategy need be only a minimum, or finite, deterrent thou
ewhat modified.
fee size of the deterrent force must be shaped b t ree
factors, ret, it must be large enough to deter, tnat is,
the United States must be red a retaliatory capability
regardless of the severity of any attack. Secondly, if it
deemed necessary to strike first, t'e a 1 tack rust be over-
whelm- g. Third, the psyehelogloal factor must be taken into
ou> t. That is that states do not always act rationally
and, therefore, a deterrent force must be large enourh to be
impress ^ ve
.
The corollary to the above is that lar-e peacetime
budgets are necessary to aintaln these forces in bei
Specifically, ting will ee done with what is on
the defense of a credible retaliatory capability nay bee
the Atomic scientists , XII (May, 1956), . 157.
.
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limitlessly expensive; the threat of war will always be a
continiing one for the forseeable future; and, the capabillt
to wage limited war requir - s a capability independent of
nuclear deterrent force.
Senator Knowland has stated that the United states
would be subjected to wnat he called "Operation Nibbling" by-
relying on only a massive retaliatory capability. That is,
the Russians would absorb neighboring countries bite by bite.
The question was, would the United Jtates actually use the
for-: of retaliation that the administration was committed to
in its early policy? Would the determent foroe be lzed
to retaliate Against a lesser a gression or provocation?
In 195^ the United States had a clear oreoonderance in
air nuclear strength and warned that it repared to
employ that strength, not only in the event of a direct
attack upon the "ed States, but also in the event of
Soviet aggression anywhere in the free world. Since that
time + oviet Union has increased its nuclear air strc. ,
thereby increaslrv the damage the United States might
suffer in responding to v.isslan aggression by an attack
i on the Soviet Jnion. c , ; ishchev and hi* col-
leagues may reason, American retaliation Against Sov
aggression becomes less certain and perhaps uncertain.
Conseo xe+ tly new oo-ortunlties open up for Soviet ex-
pansion.^?
Humanists saw (this olicy) as the death knell of the
individual, the fact that this terrible force could be un-
leashed on mankind. Obviously, tn: reasoned, the individual
^7'erbert 5. Dinersteir , ' :- .^volution in Soviet




has been completely subverted to the national interest. The
concept of nuclear war was morally i ant. :sr could no
longer be a rational extension of oolicy. Since s ..oh a wai-
ls inconceivable the administration must be bluffing and there-
fore Passive retaliation is not an effective guarantor of
seourity.
Other critics debated the fact that the m ted States
was be ire- overly aggressive; it was claying into the hands of
the ui«t prooap*anda machine with Mr. Dulles* version of
jssian roulette. It could orly be bluffing; it was obvi-
2 y madness
.
The fallacy of the ajorlty of these highly partisan
criticises was that their proponents failed to acknowledge
the shift to graduated dete^ the ad inl strati on.
I contrary, they predicated their arguments on the earlier
unaltered doctrine of Mass ve retaliation. Therefore, though
their criticisms were vociferous, they were not too germaine
to the strategic debate. They were literally kicking a dead
horse.
•ever, artisan oolltics during the 1950* s struck
wherever It could in anticipation of the electlo of i960.
In 195^-55 when the administration backed off somewhat from
strict reliance on 'assive retaliation , with the graduated
deterrence thesis and its Increased reliance on c nventional
weaoons, the critics bemoaned the huge defense expenditures.
I
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; ad^inlstrati n countered with the argument by saying that
the taxpayers were getting a bigger bang for a bud . They
averted each oas or vehicle nad vastly increased firepower
;
that there had actually been a reduction of support ersonnel,
and that we - were vastly increased In price. The Presi-
dent outlined his progran of deferse for the second Republi-
can administration in his Budget Message to the Congress in
1956:
1« Gearing; our defease preparations to a long period
of uncertainty Instead of to a succession of arbitrarily
assumed dates of maximum danger.
2. Eaintalning the capability to deter a cotential
a gressor from attack and to blunt that a- tack if it
comes--b a combination of immediate retaliatory ower
and a continental defense system of steadily increasl
effectiveness.
3. Developing military forces which maximize numbe
of men b makir ax1sua lee of science an<1 technology. **8
^n these arguments ground to a stop die to tee impasse,
a really fruitful area for debate was discovered. This was
the question of parity versus sufficiency, ssentially, it
was the beginnings of the controversy of what is now termed
overkill. The controversy began with manned combers and culmi-
nated in the famous "missile gap'1 of 1959-60. Since no one
outside the administration knew for certain exactly how many
weapons the United States had and how many the Soviet Union
^Dwlght D. Eisenhower, "'Strengthening the Defense of
the United States and Its Allies,'1 Department of State Bulls -
tin, (January 30, 19^6), p, Jko
.
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had, not to speak f the targeting roble-.i, parity was a
buloufl equation.
8 case for parity may be psychologically reassuring
to its iroponeets and it is a logical e snt when i led
to conventional forces and conventional armaments. However,
it is relatively neaj ir- less when ied to strategic nu-
ar forces. Determination of the force size of a minimum
deterrent if a -ore realistic approao . Theoretically, the
rw
.
r--r f .reaoons required simply equals the number of targets
regardless of the size of his forces, is realistic view of
forces required defines parity not in relation to the size of
his force but in relation to the number of targets he presents.
It differs fro- a counter- force strategy in tnat rather than
attempting to destroy his forces or annihilate htm, all that
is intended is tne inflicting noon him an unac eotable level
of damage.
"ficlency was a sophlstoeated estimation of require-
ments of forces necessary, taking into ac ount the number of
targets he -resents and his counter- force capability, suf-
ficiency is the heart of the overkill controversy and it will
be discussed in n ;ore detail in Chaptar V. essentially, it
revolves around the number of targets, weapons reliability,
and weapons attrition.
The world Judgement of Massive Retaliation also was in-
tense and it was varied In its criticiL To a certain degree
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this oolnion agreed with the United States partisan position.
te basic reaction abroad was that Dulles viewed the world
being bl~or>lar; that it was one of good and evil. According
to him, each nation was either pro-American and anti-Com-
munist, or anti-American and therefore of doubtful ooliti
affiliation. ey saw ml ted States >olicy as being sterile
and reactive. They believed that the Tnited States had lost
ooe and was therefore reduced to voicing threats and had
resorted to militarism.
The British reaction to the debate was reflected in
their defense White Paper of 1957- In essence it reiterated
United States 1953 strategic oolicy but with a characteristic
British twist. British defe- se plai :ers tame to the co -
elision that: (1) there -would be a reduction of conventional
forces; ( 'his eant the United States would have to assu e
more Middle Eastern commit snts and it was also a reaction to
the Suez Crisis) (2) there would be sore reliance on new
weapons i (3) they would take a long-haul view of defense,
with • 3is on the maintenance of a stable economy in \
face of flexible military procurement; and {k) there is no
effective defense in all-out war and therefore retaliatory
Ability is the only real safe resslon. In
this reepeet the British decided to place less reliance
United States deterrence by devel pin:-' an independent capa-
bility which was labelled the principle of interdependence.
-.
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During the late 1950's American deterrent capability
was enhanced by the deployment to selecter countries of
intermediate .iar.f.e fBalllstlc Missiles V ), and construction
of a complex of overseas SAC bases. The 8-52 had come LntO
l Inventory during 1955-56, and the Interc ntinental Bal-
listic wissii© (ICBW) was in the final sta^e of develop ent
as fe&s the Fleet Ballistic Missile System (] OULrtlS)
.
It was at this oolnt that the election of i960 re-
turned the Democratic Party to >o?:er, and Robert S« <ara




The Democratic victory of 196), returned the Demo-
cratic oarty to p war and sent John F. Kennedy to the hlte
House. The basic controversy over atl nal defense policy
during the presidential election campaign was thut of an
alleged missile ga p . The new administration came quickly to
lps with the problem of formulating their national defer-
str tegy. hat they found as a ler-.acy was an entirely worka-
ble strategy, sound Defense Department organization, and the
forces in being to 1- nt existing national defense nolicy.
They did accelerate development and r;rocurement within exlst-
mlssile programs and increased suroort to conventional
forces. In all fairness to the praTiOut administration, it
must be noted that these measures were done with lernental
appropriations of about six billion dollars. New and accelera-
ted programs were not absorbed within existing budget ceilings
as had those during the New Looks of 1953 and 1956. Defense
strategy was relabelled Flexible response and it differed
only In detail and the size of forces from graduated response.
The Issile '"a-. Jontroversy
The highly controversial missile gap which had domi-
nated the oresidential campaign faded f r ^m public view as the
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new administration came to ^rios with the necessity to deal
with real problems. What had happened to itr
The missile gao had been an issue in the i960 elections,
and an important faction ir the Congress demanded a crash
program to increase the number of American iCBM's in oper-
ational readiness. Bat by the end of the first siz rnths
of the new administration, the relative strength of Russia
and the United States had undergone a miraculous trans-
formation.!
As a matter of fact, the deterrent picture revealed by
the new administr: > tion was so bright that purists such as Le-
Way could openly advocate a counter- force strategy, which indi-
cates that not only was a large stock of weapons available,
the ^rosoecfs of their successful deliver^ t enjoy a high
degree of success, and the intelligence upon which their
targeting is based must be of a high degree of reliability,
ever, this bid by the Air Force to vain further ore -emi-
nence in the defense nosture, by advocating a counter-force
strategy to the new administration, failed.
rha^s the conclusion to the cor troversial missile gap
is best illustrated by Secretary of refer se KoHamar**! re-
s o se to a questlov o3ed during a press conference in June,
1961.
l«atlefii The ( louse Aporoprla ions) Jo.r lttee sug-
gested that there might be, if you will pardon the ex-
pression, a gap in the Polaris program if you did not lave
long lead time items.
Secretary arax Yes. did not request funds for
lAron, op_. olt
. , ;• ?9«
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olaris submarines beyond Bo t 2^. I will pass by without
commenting on the gs (Laughter) .2
Persons wno debated whether a pap existed to a large
extent missed the point. It was the classical argument of
the advocacy of parity versus sufficiency. Those arguing that
a gap existed were doing so on the basis of oarlty. They were
air -ower purists, to a large extent, and supported a position
of parity at a minimum. On the other hand, those who argued
that there was no gap, which included the administration, did
so from a belief in sufficiency. To them parity was meaning-
less, i them it was a matter of whether the deterrent was
credible. Otner elements of the debate concerning force size
were academic. The debate, tnerefore, was essentially un-
productive because both sides were talking past each other.
This suggests that the debate about whether there is a
deterrent gap is inheiently rnlsleadln£;. .There can be
in deterrence. Teterrence is either effective or it
is not. There is no are in for error. 'istakes are likely
to be I liable. f the gains of aggression appear to
outweigh the penalties even once, deterrence will fall.
3
The Defense Strategy of ly61
For President Kennedy, like most der?ocrates, had spoken
on both sides of the strategy issue. The safe course was
to come out for more of everything, which most liberal
Democrates did, and the result was a mixture of both strate-
es.^
2Kaufmann, oo. cit
. , p»« 50.
3Kissinger, oo_. olt . , p. 13*
^-Lowe, op, alt . , p. 212.
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The administration Mm! confronted with the following
options in developing the deterrent side of its defense poli-
cies: (1) Massive Retaliation, as modified by making it a
component of graduated deterrence, existed and ha^ been previ-
ously defined; (even if Lt aad been adopted it would have had
to have been renamed for political reasons) (2) minimum de-
terrence was the alntenance of a mall lie force aiuied
at the Boat lucrative targets which are the urban/industrial
bases, lis some counter-force target! (3) optimum mix
was the other extreme. It consisted of the maintenance of a
large enough retaliatory force to cooe with all target systems.
It would be capable of annihilating all military, Industrial,
and olvllian targets in "me great spasm; and (4) the final
option was that of Flexible riesoonse. This was also known
as war-fiphting or counter- force strategy. Used here the term
counter-force is somewhat misleading. In this context it means
that within t'ae deterrent will be the elements of some counter-
force targeting. "Our retaliatory force mat retain some
counter- force capability—at least sufficent to deter a cam-
paign of attrition against our retaliatory force. rt 5 it does
rot -ear. that the complete enemy force will be targeted. The
hasis was nore or s ifficiency rather than on Darity.
adopting the strategy of Flexible tesoonse, the
5Klssinger, 0£. clt . , )• 39 •
•
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retaliatory capability would be selective In time, targets,
and to a selected decree ,6 This Is understandably the rost
desirable and also the most comolloated and expensive deterrent
tem. A highly diversified and integrated, absolutely re-
liable, command and control system is essential to its succ
Further, the retaliatory capability must be absolutely assured
by mobility, dispersal, and hardening of the strategic att-
systems, in order to retain its credibility,
Couoled with the nuclear deterrent in Flexible response
were conventional forces of increased capability and size.
The new President outlined the following defense strategy in
hia Soeclal Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget,
March 28, I96I1
Our strategic arras and defenses must be adequate to de-
ter any deliberate nuclear attack on the United States or
•r allies by making clear to any potential a; gressor that
sufficient retaliatory forces will be able to survive a
first strike and penetrate hii defenses in order to in-
flict unacceptable losses upon him.
Those units of o ;r forces which are stationed overseas,
or are designed to fight overseas, can be :nost usefully
oriented towards deterring or confining those conflicts
which do not justify and must not lead to general nuclear
attack.
v defense posture must be both flexible and determi-
ned. Any potential aggressor c >r mating an attack on
any -art of the free world with any kind of -\ea ^one con-
ventional or nuclear must know that our response will be
suitable, selective, swift, and effective. lie he may
be uncertain of 5 ts exact nature and location t Mere must
be no uncertainty aoout o r determination*?
^Kaufmann, 00. clt
. , >• 51
•
7john P. Kennedy, To Turn the Tide, ed. John W. Gardner
i:
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1« administration chose the concent of nuclear strate-
based on a minimum deterrent coupled with sizable conven-
tional forces, and in the light of the subsequent years* ex-
periences with It, the Flexible tes onse concept remains the
most logical choice.
8
Flexible ..esconse confirmed, as graduated deterrence
had suggested, that the role of the nuclear strategic force
was confined to being that of the ultimate, or last, resort.
(New York: arper and Brothers, 1;62), n->. 58-6O. The nhrases
in the last paragraph referring to retaliation are strikingly
similar to some of the earlier pronouncements of Dulles.
^Lerohe and Said, 02. clt . , pp. 202-3. For a compre-
hensive ad-nlnlstration oriented discussion of the develop-






The role of overkill in deterrent strategy, briefly
mentioned in Chapter III, deserves separate consideration.
The popular conception of overkill is to "outdo the opposi-
tion by sheer quantity of procurement ."1 .Is is the
senseless ability to annihilate an enemy a number of times
over, and it Vs this aspect of the nuclear arms race t at has
been a major subject of political controversy.
However, on the other hand, if overkill is looked at
from the point of view of contributing to the credibility of
the deterrent due to its capability of redundant targeting,
a certa'n amount of it is necessary. Defined In these terms,
overkill has been grossly ; isunderstood. A certain amount of
overkill is as essential to the credibility of the nuclear
deterrent force as are reserve units held to the rear in con-
ventional warfare.
Is Overkill ? eoessary— Its Critics
When an i- oslng weapon such as the atomic bomb is de-
veloped there is an understandable desire on the r>art of the
strategist to ensure that it will not only be effective but





absolutely reliable. reliability of nuclear weapons is en-
hanced by improvi their efficiency, the means of delivery,
and by increasing their numbers to ensure second-strike and
re-strike ability. In the case of American defense strategy,
this effect was comoounded by early re ' iance on Passive re-
taliation. Relianc* on a single purpose weapons system set
few limits on the size of the force. What limits there were,
were a result of budgetary limitations.
At the heart of the overkill controversy are found the
proponents of a counter- force strategy. It has been shown
that such a strategy precipitates an arms race with virtually
unlimited force sizes. 2 This is the objectionable feature of
overkill, and it can hardly be condoned in light of an ac-
knowledged balanced force strategy with a minimum nuclear de-
terrent component.
But with the advocacy of Flexible Response, the Demo-
cratic administration ended the overkill controversy, and
counter- force strategists were subdued due to lack of ad-
ministration support. Though some writers still refer to the
objectionable features of overkill, present United States
2 Fred J. Cook, "The Warfare _>tate," f annals of the
American Academy of wolltlcal and social bcienoe . (January,
1964), ;;-;. 102-9. 3ee also Balph .:.. Lapp, KU1 and Overkill ;
the strategy of Annihilation (Hew fork I 3asic Books, inc.,
1962) , for a discussion of overkill defined as nuclear might
above and beyond what is sufficient for a credible deterrent.
-:
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strategy hardly reflects unnecessary overkill.
Overkill is Necessary—Strategic .requirements
Few people would disagree with the proposition that
there are finite limits to the amount of overkilling that
a power need be able to carry out. The closer one ap-
proaches these limit! the less lraoortant marginal incre-
ments in capacity become. The 501st. 1CBM. is less im-
portant than the 51 sjL» s of the explanation for this
diminisning margin of utility lies in the fact that the
ability of a missile force to ride out a surprise attack
increases progressively faster than the size of that
force, , to take a hypothetical example, that
nation A needs Just over 100 missiles to destroy nation
B and that one of 3's tiissiles would, if fired first,
have a $0 per cent chance of eliminating one of A's,
.en, if A has 200 missiles 8 has to launch only 200
missiles ap-ainst it to deprive A of Its total kill ca-
pacity. 3ut if A has 800 missiles B ^ias to serd 14C0
to miarartee doing so.
3
Theae statements and the illustration accurately oor-
tray the difficulties encountered in the determination of
what constitutes a credible deterrent, particularly, in the
extrece example, if it is based on a significant counter-
force strategy, the force nay have to be extremely large.
However, United States strategy Is based more on a credible
second-strike capability than on a counter-force strategy,
so that estimations of redundancy are more r:odest.
The first step in determining an overkill requirement
is the nolitlcal choice of deterrent strate; If a strate-
gy of reventive war Is chosen the problem is the simplest.
3Brown, on_. clt
, , p, 22 3,
-:
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The number of weapons required would only be the sum of the
targets times error factor, times attrition losses due to
launch and flight, times losses due to enemy defers There-
fore at least two missiles must be launched to hit any spe-
cific target, and the missile force is at least twice as
large as one would exoect.
If, for instance, flexible response was chosen, tne
number of weapons required would roughly be equal to all the
targets chosen, whloh also rreans combinations of weapons and
targets using alternative weaoons systems times their inherent
attrition rates during an excnanr-e, all times the error factor
or target factor, times normal launch and flight attrition,
re simply stated, the number of targets times the relia-
bility (attrition of launch and flight), times l- Dact error,
ti^es primary and secondary weaoons systems (credible second-
strike capability), times attrition of systems due to enemy
neutralization (includes command and control systems as well
as weapons). This then equals the number of weapons required
to neutralize the target system.
Without bothering to put down the mathematics, it can
be shown t at even using very conserve tive figures for losses,
as much as a six-to-one ratio of missiles to targets is re-
quired. With any increases in losses, for instance by a
significant defense, a very low weaoon reliability, or a high




Understandably, the most difficult estimations of the
oer of wea-ons required center on intelligence estimates,
and the maintenance of a credible retaliatory capability.
The intelligence esti nate must redict, In an exchange, what
our weapon losses would be not only by weapon destruction but
by disruption of the command and control system which assl
alternate targets and provides the firing signals. Determi-
nations of this type are tremendously complicated and their
resolution though susceptible to war gaming and machine a-
nalysis, come down to what amounts to a personal opinion,
only are all the above listed factors considered, a "safety
factor" is also added.
otalllng all these factors produces what seemingly is
an unnecessarily large force. however, as was shown, when
analyzed in the light of the mathematics involved and the fact
that tne size of the force is det^r ir.ed by responsible ili-
tary strategists, the size of the force is based on the princi-
ple of sufficiency. The determination of the strategy should
be a political decision and the size and composition (mix) of




Strategic nuclear bombardment by manned aircraft and
then by ralssiles became a possibility after World War II, and
the United States enjoyed a nuclear monopoly for the first
five oost-war years. The strategy of nuclear bombardment
was adopted by the United States as having been a logical
evolution In warfare.
However, through the early 195°
*
s t nuclear bombardment
was given primacy at the expense of conventional forces.
After the apparent failure of conventional forces in limi-
ted war, the republican administration elected, in 1952 » and
particularly the new Secretary of State Dulles, placed sole
reliance unon it. Passive retaliation was the name ^iven to
the adopted form of deterrence. Its function was to deter
all aggressions. The United States would massively retali-
ate at tlraes and at places of its own choosing. £aoh ag-
gression weald not necessarily be countered, but if the level
of tolerability was reached, the United States would retali-
ate at the time, with the weaoons, and at the -lace it deemed
the most effective. rhls would be with nuclear weapons and
could be directed at the Soviet Union rather than at the lo-
cation of the aggression.
'
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As the doctrine of assive detaliation evolved daring
the 1>-5>'s, national defense strategy was nodi fled to include
an increased capability to counter aggressions of the con-
ventional or limited war tyoe as well as being able to prose-
cute nuclear war. The newer strategy was termed graduated
deterrence. Lone reliance on Passive retaliation politically,
militarily, and morally had become infeasible. return to a
balanced, flexible strategy was the logical course of action.
This shift to more balanced forces was principally due
to the facts that ussia had developed a similar nuclear
strategic capability which brought about a nuclear stalemate;
and because the credibility of Passive rietaliation as a de-
terrent had been tested and found wanting in thfl lesser pro-
vocations subsequent to the Korean war.
Strong voice was given to continuing and bolstering the
development of a balanced strategic national policy during the
election of i960. It evolved, this new strategy, as Flexi-
ble response. In reality it differed only in degree from
graduated deterrence. The nuclear deterrent force continued
to be relegated to the role of the ultimate response. The
United states increased the size and flexibility of its con-
ventional forces to counter lesser aggressions. ever,
as orevioasly, the administration reserved the right to re-
taliate with nuclear arms even to a sub-nuclear aggression.
This aspect of the strategy had not altered.
•
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The doctrine of Flexible desponse was not a panacea,
nor was It gained at the expense of a modest or balanced
budget. The United States was maintaining two and one-half
million r.en under arms with a defense budget approximating
fifty billion dollars, approximately 10 per cent of the gross
national product, l'he doctrine of Flexible response was a
logioal step In the evolution of a strategy which could cope
with the vicissitudes of the Cold War.
Finally, in order to maintain a credible deterrer t a
certain amount of overkill is required. At face value, and
In the popular image, overkill appears unnecessary, tiowever,
when overkill is divorced from the partisan supporters of a
counter- force strat c cy, its redundancy does lend credibility
to the deterre t.
In summary, the altered role of the nuclear deterrent
in ' nitel states defense policy is best ex Gained by the
ourrent secretary of Defense;
e deter the Soviets from using their growing nuclear
force by maintaining a nuclear force strong enough and
survlvable enough to ride out any conceivable nuclear a-
ttack, and to survive with sufficient power to cause un-
acceptable damage to the attacker.
1
1Address by aobert o. KcNamara delivered to the Army
Association, Washington, D.C., October 10, 1962, quoted in
i
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